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This article investigates the circumstances under which the threat of 
ICC prosecution has proved successful in deterring the commission or 
escalation of mass atrocities. Through a within-case analysis of the 
domestic situation of Côte d’Ivoire between 2004 and 2011, I find 
evidence that successful deterrence is a function of two main causal 
variables, namely the likelihood of arrest or punishment and the leaders’ 
outlook on retaining power in the short-run. I argue that specific values 
on these variables combined to determine how the threat of ICC 
prosecution successfully deescalated violence in Côte d’Ivoire in the fall 
of 2004. This article challenges a set of assumptions widely employed by 
legal scholars in theorizing international deterrence, stresses the 
importance of bringing back the relational character of deterrence and 
concludes by advocating greater attention to the political conditions 
surrounding ICC operations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Well before the International Criminal Court (ICC) entered into force 
on July 1, 2002, a lively debate had flourished over its deterrent 
potential.1 Scholars and professionals alike began to ask crucial questions 
about the Court, including perhaps the most important (and contentious) 
of all: Can the ICC really deter potential perpetrators from committing 
“atrocity crimes”?2 If so, how is the ICC different from other 
international criminal tribunals (ICTs), which have so far failed to bring 
about system-wide deterrence? Almost fourteen years into ICC 
operations, the above-mentioned debate is far from settled. Not only is 
there still no agreement as to whether the ICC contributes to the 
deterrence of atrocities, but there is also a growing body of literature that 
claims, under particular circumstances, it actually exacerbates, rather 
than restrains, the use of violence.3 That said, the notion of deterrence is 
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11.  On the vast scholarly commentary on the ICC preventive impact, see, inter 
alios, David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 473, 473–44 (1999); Tom Ginsburg, Clash of Commitments at the 
International Criminal Court, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 499, 501–02 (2009). 
 2. David J. Scheffer, Atrocity Crimes Litigation During 2009, 8 NW. J. INT’L 
HUM. RTS. 1, 236 (2010) (categorizing atrocity crimes as the “crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes”). 
 3. See Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 507, 507–08 (1999) [hereinafter The 
Amnesty Exception]; Michael L. Smidt, The International Criminal Court: An Effective 
Means of Deterrence, 167 MIL. L. REV. 156, 180 (2001); Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D. 
Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, 132 DAEDALUS 47, 48 (2003); Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, 
Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 777–78 (2006); Adam Branch, Uganda’s Civil War and the 
Politics of ICC Intervention, 21 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 179, 189 (2007). 
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literally ubiquitous in the scholarship on the ICC; and it can hardly be 
otherwise since one of its stated goals is in fact “to contribute to the 
prevention of [grave] crimes” that “threaten the peace, security and well-
being of the world.”4 Scholars surveying statements issued by public 
figures have shown that from the onset, deterrence has belonged in the 
official rhetoric on what the Court is expected to accomplish.5 One oft-
cited example of such statements is by then-United Nations (UN) 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who greeted the Rome Statute’s entry 
into force wishing the newly born court would serve the purpose of 
deterring future war criminals and eradicating impunity for all those who 
abuse human rights.6 Former ICC President San-Hyun Song lists 
deterrence as one of the four effects substantiating the Court’s preventive 
potential7 and further identifies it as “the most direct preventative effect 
of international justice.”8  
  
 4. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 16, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 5. See, e.g., Christopher W. Mullins & Dawn L. Rothe, The Ability of the 
International Criminal Court to Deter Violations of International Criminal Law: A 
Theoretical Assessment, 10 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 771, 772 (2010); Dawn L. Rothe & 
Isabel Schoultz, Law, Courts, and Punishment as Deterrent Mechanisms?, in CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 151–54 (Willem de Lint et al. eds., Routledge 2014); 
David Bosco, The International Criminal Court and Crime Prevention: Byproduct or 
Conscious Goal, 19 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 163, 164, 170, 172 (2010). 
 6. James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of 
Atrocities: Predicting the Court’s Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1, 10 (2009). 
 7. Sang-Hyun Song, Preventive Potential of the International Criminal Court, 3 
ASIAN J. INT’L L. 203, 206 (2013). 
 8. Id. at 207. On this point, it bears recalling that the ICC is not the first ICT to 
invoke deterrence. James Meernik reminds us that both the charters of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) “make reference to the deterrent function of international 
justice.” James Meernik, Justice, Power and Peace: Conflicting Interests and the 
Apprehension of ICC Suspects, 13 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 169, 175 (2013). Further, the 
ICTR Trial Chamber employed deterrence as a guiding principle in determining the 
severity of sentences in hopes of dissuading future perpetrators. Alexander, supra note 6, 
at 10 n.37. Yet, from such remarks it remains difficult to speculate on whether or not 
claims on the ICC deterrent impact are more than simply cheap talk. Similarly, see 
Mullins & Rothe, supra note 5, at 772. 
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Politically, international criminal justice embodies an ambitious 
normative project that remained dormant for half a century after the trials 
staged in Nuremberg and Tokyo and then timidly re-emerged after the 
Cold War ended.9 It was only after state-sponsored episodes of mass 
violence in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which shocked the 
conscience of key global actors (in primis the United States), that the 
idea of an international criminal justice system gained enough 
momentum and took off.10 However, the two ad hoc tribunals were 
conceived by the international community as a response to already-
committed atrocities rather than an instrument to prevent future ones.11 
The above timeline in fact suggests that deterrence played at best a 
marginal part in informing decision-makers’ decisions at the onset of the 
international criminal justice enterprise. Recent work in international law 
and politics has so far failed to solve the conundrum of how ICTs can 
improve compliance with international criminal law (ICL) through 
deterrent mechanisms.12 As a result, the current state of the field is 
surprisingly discouraging; despite efforts to point out and reckon with the 
issue above, scholars nevertheless have failed to provide compelling 
solutions thereto.13 James Alexander, for instance, notices that the most 
  
 9. On the importance of the geopolitical climate for establishing and further 
enhancing the ICL regime, see JOHN HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS: PROSECUTING 
WAR CRIMES IN THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL 28–30 (2003). 
 10. On this point, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in 
Seventy-five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 59–61 (1997); Song, supra note 7, at 204; DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH 
JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN A WORLD OF POWER POLITICS 38 
(2014). 
 11. Alexander, supra note 6, at 36 (citing GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE 
HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 207 (2000)). 
 12. For a critical assessment of the state of the field, see Ginsburg, supra note 1; 
Alexander, supra note 6; Kate Cronin-Furman, Managing Expectations: International 
Criminal Trials and the Prospects for Deterrence of Mass Atrocity, 7 INT’L J. 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 434, 435 (2013). On the ICTY, see Payam Akhavan, Justice in the 
Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia?, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 744 (1999). 
 13. Alexander, supra note 6, at 55; see also Cronin-Furman, supra note 12; 
Payam Akhavan, Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?: 
Reconciling Judicial Romanticism with Political Realism, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 624, 636 
(2009). 
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serious—and enduring, I shall add—problem affecting the scholarship 
either affirming or denying ICTs’ preventive potential is “the tendency 
on both sides of the debate to state relatively strong conclusions without 
much evidentiary support.”14 Dawn Rothe and Isabel Schoultz warn us 
against taking deterrence as a certainty,15 while Christopher Mullins and 
Dawn Rothe maintain that “[ICC] [p]ractitioners and scholars routinely 
assume a probability at best, to an assumption of sureness, of a powerful 
deterrent effect.”16 
Bearing this shortcoming in mind, this Article investigates the 
circumstances under which the threat of ICC prosecution has proved 
successful in deterring the commission or escalation of mass atrocities. 
Thus, this Article is conceived to be an empirically driven project with 
an ultimate end of providing new hints for (better) theoretical deterrence 
at the international level. Within the broader literature on the ICL regime 
and its alleged deterrent effects, this Article also represents a call for 
caution. Writing in 2001, Christopher Rudolph sought to determine how 
an effective atrocities regime could eventually be used “to manage 
violent conflict and reduce the likelihood of future transgressions.”17 This 
Article draws extensively on Rudolph’s work and builds on many of his 
findings, including the need to keep in mind realist factors (e.g., the 
strategic interests of the most powerful states), to consider greater 
institutional flexibility in order to increase regime strength, and to move 
beyond purely legalistic views of war crimes adjudication so as to 
capture the political dimensions involved in regime formation.18 Yet, I 
hereby contend that, as of 2015, the scholarship dedicated to the study of 
legal deterrence at the international level has surprisingly limited 
knowledge of cases wherein the threat of ICC prosecution has proven 
successful in deterring potential perpetrators. Further, scholars have not 
  
 14. Alexander, supra note 6, at 55. 
 15. Rothe & Schoultz, supra note 5, at 151. 
 16. Mullins & Rothe, supra note 5, at 772. 
 17. Christopher Rudolph, Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War 
Crimes Tribunals, 55 INT’L ORG. 655, 656 (2001). 
 18. Id. at 686–87. Jeffrey W. Legro also makes reference to a “‘strategic realist’ 
view” of international law, although his argument applies to compliance with the law 
rather than regime formation. Jeffrey W. Legro, Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the 
“Failure” of Internationalism, 51 INT’L ORG. 31, 45 (1997). 
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yet identified those causal factors determining the above threat to work 
differently across cases—a task the Rome Statute has made easier at the 
methodological level, for it allows for consistency of the law over time 
and space. This is not to deny that Rudolph pointed his peers in the right 
direction. Rather, I posit that only upon gaining a better understanding of 
the causal mechanisms underpinning new theories of legal deterrence at 
the international level will it be possible to engage the question of how 
political actors can strategically employ the threat of ICC prosecution as 
a conflict resolution resource or political bargaining chip.  
The first logical step of this Article is therefore to identify a most-
likely case, that is, a case where the threat of ICC prosecution is said to 
have dissuaded potential perpetrators from acting in violation of ICL 
norms. To this end, in the empirical section I carry out a thorough 
within-case analysis of Côte d’Ivoire (CIV) from September 2002—
when the first Ivorian civil war broke out—until April 2011—when the 
second Ivorian civil war ended with President Laurent Gbagbo’s arrest.19 
Numerous analytical and methodological reasons suggest that Côte 
d’Ivoire is an ideal case study for the task I purport to address in this 
Article. First, I choose to look at the example of Côte d’Ivoire because 
scholars agree that, with the looming specter of ICC prosecution, senior 
state leaders decided to deescalate violence driven by the fear of the 
consequences they could otherwise face.20 At first glance, the sequence 
of events supports scholarly contentions that deterrence was at work in 
  
 19. Not all scholars consider these two conflicts as separate events, and, instead, 
believe that the conflicts were two rounds of violence driven by the same grievance. See, 
e.g., LAIA BALCELLS, RIVALRY AND REVENGE: THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE IN CIVIL WAR 
(forthcoming 2016) (on file with author).  
 20. Akhavan, supra note 13, at 625, 640; Bosco, supra note 5, at 177; Michael 
McGovern, conversely, states that “the [mere] threat of being disqualified or rendered 
illegitimate, whether this meant imprisonment or simply (local or international) censure 
does appear to have played a role in Côte d’Ivoire in making some of the combatants 
‘think twice’ about committing atrocities or allowing atrocities to be committed under 
their command.” Michael McGovern, Proleptic Justice: The Threat of Investigation as a 
Deterrent to Human Rights Abuses in Côte d’Ivoire, in MIRRORS OF JUSTICE: LAW AND 
POWER IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 67, 81 (Kamari Maxine Clarke & Mark Goodale 
eds., 2014). 
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this case.21 A causal mechanism, deterrence, seemingly links together an 
observed outcome—restraint in the use of violence—to its alleged 
cause—the mere existence of the ICL regime along with an operating 
institution tasked with enforcing ICL norms. Moreover, the proposed 
independent variable is both logically and temporally prior to the 
observed outcome. By selecting Côte d’Ivoire as a case study, I prove 
that the mere existence of the ICL regime, thenceforth “administered” by 
the ICC, is but a trivial condition—that is formally necessary, yet 
endowed with limited explanatory power.22  
The second (methodological) reason for choosing Côte d’Ivoire is that 
it presents variation in outcomes over time. This entails that, even 
controlling for a wide array of legal and non-legal variables, deterrence 
did not always succeed in shaping Ivorian leaders’ decisions. It further 
follows that, since the legal scaffolding has been held constant over time, 
the cause of why deterrence has at times proven successful must be 
exogenous to the ICL regime and the ICC as the governing institution 
thereof.  
Third, this qualitative study provides a starting point for future 
comparative work on cases falling under ICC scrutiny. While the study 
of a single case is insufficient to extract the generally-valid assertions 
necessary for theory-building, this Article seeks to pinpoint untested—
but testable—hypotheses to be later developed into mid-level theories on 
how ICTs can be used “in establishing justice and promoting peace.”23  
Substantially, this Article stresses the limits of modern legal 
deterrence theory (LDT). Within the debate on the relationship between 
peace and justice, I contend that envisaging amnesties could, under 
  
 21. Mainstream methodologists maintain that “[s]ingle-case studies are 
particularly useful in challenging already-existing theories, if these theories are precisely 
formulated.” Henry E. Brady et al., Refocusing the Discussion on Methodology, in 
RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED STANDARDS 28 (Henry E. Brady 
& David Collier eds., 2d ed. 2010). 
 22. A comment on this point is due. The intention here is not to downplay the 
Court’s importance, but rather to identify causal factors at play in both within-case and 
cross-case analysis. Since a number of countries, including state parties to the ICC, have 
experienced mass atrocities after the ICC has been established, the Court’s existence 
cannot be regarded as a causal variable retaining great explanatory power. 
 23. Rudolph, supra note 17, at 687. 
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certain circumstances, enhance rational deterrence theory (RDT). Indeed, 
the latter pivots on a rigid incentive structure that is not designed to 
cover instances where exogenous24 threats alter payoffs by discounting 
the cost of non-compliance with the laws; in similar situations, non-
compliance becomes a “second-worst” outcome.25 When making 
decisions under threats to their physical or political survival, state and 
rebel leaders alike are expected to privilege short-term gains over long-
term considerations.26 Introducing amnesties may provide the necessary 
positive payoff for actors who have fallen out of the RDT frame and can 
thus exacerbate violence at no additional cost.27 But rethinking RDT is 
neither the only nor the most important focus of this Article. Indeed, the 
key goal of this Article is to challenge a set of assumptions undergirding 
domestic theories of legal deterrence—assumptions that are now, almost 
uncritically, applied to the international realm.28  
  
 24. The term “exogenous” is hereby used as a synonym for “non-state.” In a 
Weberian model, the state has the monopoly of legitimate violence, which means it is the 
only entity with the authority to threaten criminal punishment for breaking the law. 
However, this is an ideal type, and, as such, it does not take into account non-state actors 
who pose a credible threat to decision-makers. Considering exogenous threats becomes 
even more important in situations of civil conflict, where the authority of the state is 
necessarily contested and often compromised. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in 
FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1991). 
 25. See Cronin-Furman, supra note 12, at 444–45; Ku & Nzelibe, supra note 3, at 
793. 
 26. Brian Job, in writing about Third World states facing a security environment 
that he labels an “insecurity dilemma,” maintains that “[s]tates (more appropriately, 
regimes) are preoccupied with the short-term; their security and their physical survival 
are dependent on the strategies they pursue for the moment.” Brian L. Job, The Insecurity 
Dilemma: National Regime, and State Securities in the Third World, in THE INSECURITY 
DILEMMA: NATIONAL SECURITY OF THIRD WORLD STATES 27 (Brian L. Job ed., 1992). 
 27. See Matthew Brubacher, The ICC Investigation of the Lord’s Resistance 
Army: An Insider’s View, in THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY: MYTH AND REALITY 264–66 
(Tim Allen & Koen Vlassenroot eds., 2010); Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace with 
Justice: The International Criminal Court and Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 
23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 211 (2007); Bosco, supra note 5, at 182–83. On the short-term 
incompatibility of achieving peace and obtaining justice, see also Michael P. Scharf, 
From the Exile Files: An Essay on Trading Justice for Peace, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
339, 342 (2006). 
 28. See Smidt, supra note 3, at 182–84; Mullins & Rothe, supra note 5, at 772; 
Rothe & Schoultz, supra note 5, at 155. 
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Particularly problematic at the international level are two assumptions 
that practitioners and scholars hardly consider when pondering the 
preventive impact of ICTs (including the ICC).29 The first assumption, to 
be quickly revisited and dismissed, is the tendency to conflate the 
threatener (he who voices the threat of punishment) with the enforcer (he 
who is tasked with apprehending suspects and inflicting sanctions). This 
tendency is justified at the domestic level, where the state latu sensu 
plays both roles; conversely, ICTs lack empowered policing agencies and 
therefore must rely on state cooperation.30 The second assumption is 
specular to the first. Scholars agree that not all individuals are equally 
responsive to the threat of sanctions; those who have more at stake are 
more likely to desist from committing or otherwise facilitating criminal 
activity.31 To this end, the ICC’s lasting focus on Africa (as of May 2015, 
the Office of the Prosecutor is investigating nine situations in eight 
African countries and conducting two preliminary examinations on 
Guinea and Nigeria) may actually help furthering our understanding of 
how deterrence works in practice by providing geopolitical context to the 
conceptualization of international deterrence.32 
This Article takes shape in three parts. First, it reviews legal 
deterrence theories and outlines the novelties introduced by ICC norms 
and practices. Recent improvements notwithstanding, in this Article I 
  
 29. “Mark Drumbl has . . . [warned] that international lawyers too often import 
domestic criminological assumptions into the international realm whole cloth.” 
Alexander, supra note 6, at 15 n.60 (citing Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and 
Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 539, 545–46 
(2004)). This Article argues that researchers have largely ignored Drumbl’s warning.  
 30. See Bosco, supra note 5, at 169. 
 31. In the field of criminology, researchers have long studied the relationship 
between “social location and position” and deterrence. Mullins & Rothe, supra note 5, at 
774; see, e.g., Rothe & Schoultz, supra note 5, at 156; Raymond Paternoster & Sally 
Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of 
Corporate Crime, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 549, 550–51 (1996). A similar point in the field of 
international law and politics has been made by Hun Joon Kim & Kathryn Sikkink, 
Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional 
Countries, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 939, 940–41 (2010). 
 32. On this point, David Bosco notices that “[t]ension has emerged between the 
court and many African member states over the emphasis on African conflicts.” Bosco, 
supra note 5, at 198. 
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argue that legal scholars can learn tremendously by importing key 
concepts from political science. I conclude the first section by advocating 
for greater flexibility in the application of existing ICC norms. Second, I 
introduce the concepts of extended and immediate deterrence and adapt 
them to the scholarship on legal deterrence. Once identities and 
preferences are attached to the players involved in the “threat game,” it 
becomes clear that theories other than RDT are better equipped to 
explain variation both across and within cases. The main takeaway from 
this section lies in the acknowledgement that it is no longer possible to 
disregard the identity of those who face the threat of ICC prosecution and 
those who are willing to bear the political and non-political costs of 
enforcing ICC decisions.33 Successful deterrence is a function of the 
specific relationship running between these two players. Third, I present 
the Côte d’Ivoire case study. This section emphasizes variations in 
outcomes while holding players constant, which I explain through one of 
my two independent variables: leadership survival. The latter, in turn, 
moves the focus beyond mere considerations of power; it does so by 
drawing on the scholarship on perceptions, spearheaded by Robert Jervis, 
and the above-said scholarship on social position.34 The overall goal is to 
further our understanding of the ICC preventive potential by placing 
court operations “in a world of power politics,”35 rather than in a legal 
vacuum. Finally, the case study of Côte d’Ivoire lends support to the 
claim that the non-legal circumstances surrounding the threat of 
international prosecution determine, case by case, whether the ICL 
regime will deter or exacerbate violence. 
  
 33. Meernik, supra note 8, at 180. Meernik also states the need to unpack the 
“international community,” for it is no “single actor with clear, consistent and readily 
identifiable interests.” Id. at 179. 
 34. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 35. BOSCO, supra note 10, at 1. 
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I. MIXING APPLES AND ORANGES? THE ICC AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
APPLYING DOMESTIC DETERRENCE THEORIES TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
“[I]t is virtually impossible to assess whether or not the threat of 
prosecution has ever prevented genocide and war crimes.”  
– Miriam Aukerman36  
 
In 1924, John H. Wigmore famously called deterrence “‘the kingpin 
of the criminal law.’”37 It can be said that little has changed since then, as 
few legal scholars or professionals nowadays would downplay, let alone 
deny, the role of deterrence as one of the key purposes of criminal 
punishment.38 Since the publication and diffusion of seminal works by 
Thomas Hobbes,39 Cesare Beccaria,40 and Jeremy Bentham41 legal 
theorists have focused exclusively on domestic criminal law and justice 
systems.42 Mullins and Rothe, for instance, argue that “[c]riminology in 
general has ignored international criminal law and international criminal 
justice; likewise, international criminal justice institutions and 
practitioners generally ignore criminological research.”43 This might not 
have been a problem until the early 1990s, when the ICL regime project 
resumed, but it now begs the question of whether theories thought for 
and applied to domestic settings fit the international realm too. To be 
clear, criminologists are not the only scholars who overlook the salient 
  
 36. Rothe & Schoultz, supra note 5, at 157 (quoting Miriam J. Aukerman, 
Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional 
Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 66 (2002)). 
 37. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A 
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1, 4 (2003) (quoting A Symposium of Comments from the Legal Profession, 15 J. AM. 
INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 401 (1924)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 38. On this point, see Alexander, supra note 6, at 2; Bosco, supra note 5, at 169. 
 39. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Scolar Press 1969) (1651). 
 40. See generally CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Seven 
Treasures Publications 2009) (1764). 
 41. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Prometheus Books 1988) (1789). 
 42. See Mullins & Rothe, supra note 5, at 772.  
 43. Id. 
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differences between domestic and international criminal law. Policy-
makers, professionals and scholars in the fields of law, sociology, 
psychology, and penology deserve to share the blame. Thus, in this 
Article I group together all extant deterrence theories inhabiting these 
disciplines under the broad umbrella of LDT. I do so consciously, as I 
hereby purport to show (1) the major limitations inherent in extant 
deterrence theories, (2) the improvements introduced by ICC norms and 
practices, (3) how teachings drawn from political science scholarship 
contribute to better theorize deterrence at the international level, and (4) 
how these teachings apply to the case study of Côte d’Ivoire. In this 
section, as said, I address the first and second points. 
As earlier mentioned, LDT employs a set of assumptions that are 
useless for scholars who engage in the study of international law and 
politics in hopes of improving their understanding of how deterrence 
works at the international level. Proponents of deterrence maintain that 
individuals (or players in game-theoretic jargon) decide whether to obey 
or violate the law after striking a cost-benefit analysis of their actions.44 
While this function of expected utility has been the cornerstone of LDT, 
early theories envisaged a role for emotions, in particular for instilling 
fear.45 Only at a later time did the rationality postulate tighten; fear was 
“rationalized” and reduced to the emotionless concept of cost.46 RDT 
rose to the forefront of academic debate,47 despite the efforts of 
  
 44. Such a course of reasoning, imbued with rationalist tenets, is what James 
March and Johan P. Olsen referred to as the “logic of consequences,” in turn opposed to 
the norm-driven “logic of appropriateness.” JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, 
REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 160–62 (1989); 
see also KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS 
ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 236 (2011). Somewhat similarly, Leslie Vinjamuri talks 
about “the triumph of consequences” in emphasizing that instrumental purposes of justice 
are replacing moral and legal ones in the mainstream narrative of advocacy organizations. 
Leslie Vinjamuri, Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit of International Justice, 24 
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 191, 198–201 (2010). 
 45. Ronald L. Akers, Rational Choice, Deterrence, and Social Learning Theory 
in Criminology: The Path Not Taken, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 660 (1990–
1991). 
 46. For a critique, see infra, notes 47 and 48. 
 47. For information on RDT and its dominant—yet contested—role in the study 
of deterrence, see generally Robert Jervis, Deterrence Theory Revisited, 31 WORLD POL. 
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proponents of cognitive psychology and social learning who pushed back 
against the rationality postulate.48 Yet criminal law, whether at the 
domestic or international level, resonates well with another postulate 
undergirding RDT. Rational choice, indeed, assumes that players hold 
perfect information of the payoff structure when making their 
decisions.49 Criminal law notably shifts the burden of knowledge on 
potential perpetrators.50 Thus, they must know which conduct is formally 
sanctioned and which is not, for ignorance of the law neither excuses nor 
mitigates criminal liability. In this regard, the high precision of the 
provisions envisaged in the Rome Statute allows future perpetrators to 
know beforehand what conduct substantiates the international crimes 
falling within the ICC jurisdiction.51  
In the everlasting academic and policy debate on crime prevention, 
there is some agreement that three main factors (namely certainty, 
severity and celerity of punishment) jointly determine successful 
deterrence.52 Empirical research has established that certainty affects the 
above cost-benefit analysis more than considerations of severity or 
  
289 (1979) [hereinafter Deterrence Theory Revisited]; Christopher H. Achen & Duncan 
Snidal, Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies, 41 WORLD POL. 143 
(1989); Robert Jervis, Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 41 WORLD POL. 183 
(1989); Richard Ned Lebow & Janice Gross Stein, Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, 
Therefore I Deter, 41 WORLD POL. 208 (1989); George W. Downs, The Rational 
Deterrence Debate, 41 WORLD POL. 225 (1989). 
 48. For materials in opposition to the “dominant” RDT, see generally Irving 
Piliavin et al., Crime, Deterrence, and Rational Choice, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 101 (1986); 
Ronald L. Akers, Rational Choice, Deterrence, and Social Learning Theory in 
Criminology: The Path Not Taken, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653 (1990); Daniel S. 
Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction 
Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865 
(2001). 
 49. For a critical view of applying the assumption of rationality to criminal 
behavior, see Akers, supra note 45, at 661–69. 
 50. Ignorantia juris non excusat, or ignorance of law excuses no one, a Latin 
maxim says. 
 51. For a discussion on precision as a dimension of the broader concept of 
legalization, see Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 I INT’L ORG. 
401, 412–14 (2000). 
 52. Conversely, Kathryn Sikkink considers only certainty and severity, thus 
excluding the celerity factor. SIKKINK, supra note 44, at 170. 
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celerity.53 This finding raises more questions than it answers. Certainty is 
used as an independent variable in this causal framework: the greater the 
certainty of punishment, the lower the crime rates. But certainty should 
in turn be conceived as a function of other factors, including the 
technology, material means, and intelligence available to law 
enforcement agencies, and the number of officers deployed within a 
given territory. This is tantamount to say that, all other things being 
equal, potential perpetrators are less likely to break the law where police 
forces are greater in number and better equipped, as these factors directly 
affect the probability of being caught and punished. Now, this line of 
reasoning does not and cannot apply at the international level, since the 
ICC was intentionally left without an autonomous enforcement agency 
and must rely on state cooperation.54 Thus, one of the domestic 
assumptions we must dismiss at the ICC level is the conflation between 
the threatener and the enforcer. Domestically, the state performs both 
roles. Laws prohibit certain conduct public prosecutors oversee 
investigations and press charges, courts try alleged perpetrators, and 
police forces enforce the laws and decisions issued by other state 
authorities. All these actors fulfill their duties in the name of and on 
behalf of the state and act under the umbrella of the state as the 
legitimate monopolist of violence.55 Unfortunately, this is not the case of 
the ICC. 
Bearing in mind the three above-listed factors, the Assembly of State 
Parties can intervene on the institutional design of the Court to boost the 
severity factor; amendments to the Rome Statute can criminalize new 
  
 53. Mullins & Rothe, supra note 5, at 773; see also Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & 
Lawrence E. Cohen, Self-interest, Equity, and Crime Control: A Game-theoretic Analysis 
of Criminal Decision Making, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 483, 487–88, 503 (1995); Daniel S. 
Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 
CRIME & JUST. 1, 2, 6–8 (1998); ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE 
AND SENTENCE SEVERITY: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH 1–13 (1999); Bill 
McCarthy, New Economics of Sociological Criminology, 28 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 417, 
419–20 (2002). 
 54. The ICC is by no means the first international tribunal to face challenges 
related to the lack of enforcement powers. For a comparison with the ICTY, see HAGAN, 
supra note 9, at 74, 84, 93, 99. 
 55. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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conduct or envisage harsher punishments for existing crimes. On 
celerity, the ICC can undertake to improve its current performance and 
make future trials quicker. Needless to say, the most salient problem 
facing the ICC is certainty. As enshrined in the Rome Statute, drafters 
decided to outsource law enforcement to states.56 In theory, state parties 
have a legal obligation to comply with ICC decisions and rulings, while 
non-state parties are under no such obligation unless the UN Security 
Council refers their domestic situation to the Court.57 In practice, 
however, even state parties have at times refused to cooperate with the 
Court.58 The explanation, I claim, is quite intuitive: compliance with ICC 
decisions has proven costly in both economic and political terms. The 
logic at play is similar to that of imposing multilateral sanctions on a 
third country; states may have a real interest in imposing sanctions, yet 
they wish other states will bear the costs of doing so.59 Put otherwise, the 
costs of imposing sanctions offset the interests of undertaking such a 
measure.60 Thus, what is needed is (at least) one leading actor who can 
co-opt others to participate and, in case he or she fails to do so, acts 
unilaterally. As I demonstrate below, Côte d’Ivoire is a successful case 
mostly—albeit not exclusively—because of French political interference 
and military intervention in that country. I contend that, in this case, 
while ICC and UN officials routinely raised the specter of ICC 
  
 56. On state cooperation and related issues, see Valerie Oosterveld, Mike Perry & 
John McManus, The Cooperation of States with the International Criminal Court, 25 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 767, 767 (2001). 
 57. Id. at 770. 
 58. For a list of episodes of non-compliance with ICC obligations, see BOSCO, 
supra note 10, at 158. 
 59. On collective action problems in bearing the costs of global governance, see 
Ethan B. Kapstein, Power, Fairness, and the Global Economy, in POWER IN GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 88 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., Cambridge University Press 
2005). 
 60. For a better understanding of the logic underlying the imposition of sanctions 
on third parties, see Lisa L. Martin, Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on 
Economic Sanctions, 45 WORLD POL. 406, 413–16 (1993); William H. Kaempfer & 
Anton D. Lowenberg, Unilateral versus Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public 
Choice Perspective, 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 37, 37–43, 46–51 (1999); Daniel W. Drezner, 
Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When is Cooperation 
Counterproductive?, 54 INT’L ORG. 73, 73–75 (2000). 
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prosecution (i.e., the threateners), Ivorian leaders feared France (i.e., the 
enforcer) rather than the toothless Court in The Hague.61 In all, domestic 
LDT holds the state constant as the source of threat. At the international 
level, by contrast, it does not really matter who the threatener is; what 
does matter is remembering that while the enforcer can potentially vary 
every time, the threat of ICC prosecution is voiced. 
There is a second—and specular—working assumption that ought to 
be dismissed when moving from domestic to international deterrence 
theories. All extant ICTs—and the ICC is no exception—target state and 
rebel senior leaders, that is, those who order, instigate or otherwise aid 
and abet the commission of atrocity crimes because of the position they 
hold along the command chain.62 To date, deterrence scholars have not 
  
 61. For a non-exhaustive list of threats of ICC prosecution voiced by UN or ICC 
officials, see Akhavan, supra note 13, at 639; McGovern, supra note 20, at 72; Scott 
Straus, ‘It’s Sheer Horror Here’: Patterns of Violence During the First Four Months of 
Côte d’Ivoire’s Post-Electoral Crisis, 110 AFR. AFF. 481, 483 (2011); Alex J. Bellamy & 
Paul D. Williams, The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the 
Responsibility to Protect, 87 INT’L AFF. 825, 833 (2011). 
 62. Historically, this “selection” process started off at Nuremberg and, except for 
the ICTY’s early years, has remained valid through today. Charles C. Jalloh, Prosecuting 
Those Bearing “Greatest Responsibility”: The Lessons of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 863, 872 (2013). The formulas ICTs have employed to justify 
the choice of who is worth prosecuting are intentionally vague and ill defined. See id. at 
872–80. The Special Court for Sierra Leone, for instance, is granted “the power to 
prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law.” Agreement between the United 
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the establishment of a Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, art. 1, ¶ 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145. Similarly, the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials sought to bring to justice “‘major war criminals,’” identified as those who 
led, organized, instigated, or conspired to commit any of the crimes envisaged by their 
charters. Jalloh, supra note 62, at 873 (citing Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East art. 1, Jan. 19, 1946, 4 U.S.T. 20). Lastly, despite not setting 
forward explicit criteria for personal jurisdiction, it is also fair to state that the ICC is 
interested in targeting only those bearing the greatest responsibility for the commission of 
international crimes. Id. at 879. Empirical evidence of who has actually been prosecuted 
by ICTs strongly supports the claim that international prosecution is reserved to high-
profile perpetrators. Id. at 889. Mass atrocities require planning, and only those at the top 
of the command chain can deliver well-crafted plans and provide the leadership necessary 
to carry them out. Id. As Charles Jalloh underscores, this ongoing “selection practice” 
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paid due attention to the selection ratione personae operated by the 
ICTs.63 Yet confusing senior political or military leaders with average 
citizens is likely to hamper understandings of deterrent mechanisms 
internationally. On this point, a significant improvement in the scholarly 
debate followed the work on social position.64 Sociologists and 
criminologists successfully tested a fairly intuitive hypothesis, according 
to which “those in positions with more at stake to risk are more likely to 
desist and or refrain from crime.”65 A related improvement in the field is 
the increasing attention now paid to non-legal sanctions;66 social 
sanctions can alter the risk calculus.67 Decision-makers in both the 
private and public sectors do (and should) take into account reputational 
concerns affecting themselves at the personal or organizational level.  
In turn, these findings raise a number of new interesting questions for 
scholars of international law and politics—questions that this Article 
seeks to engage. First, do social sanctions affect the time-horizon of 
potential high-level offenders? It is possible to claim that social sanctions 
follow the arrest, not the conviction, and thus apply sooner than legal 
  
entails “that the middle and lower ranking suspects would be investigated and prosecuted 
in domestic courts.” Id. at 872. Writing about the investigation that eventually led to the 
trial of General Radislav Krstić before the ICTY, John Hagan duly emphasized that “the 
events at Srebrenica were planned and highly organized in ways reflective of systematic 
genocide.” HAGAN, supra note 9, at 157. In conclusion, both analytical reasoning and 
empirical evidence suggest that elite involvement, often revealed through the position 
held along the chain of command, amounts to a necessary condition for ICC prosecution. 
 63. On this point, Akers correctly points out that “[d]eterrence locates variation 
of criminal behavior in only one part (direct positive punishment of criminal behavior) of 
one side of the overall reinforcement equation, albeit including the three modalities of 
certainty, severity, and celerity.” Akers, supra note 45, at 660. It follows that all 
“players” are assumed to act alike regardless of their social position. 
 64. See Kim & Sikkink, supra note 31, at 945, 959.  
 65. Rothe & Schoultz, supra note 5, at 156; see also Mullins & Rothe, supra note 
5, at 774. 
 66. In this regard, it bears underscoring that Hun Joon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink 
are, to the author’s knowledge, the first political scientists to carry out a quantitative 
analysis on the deterrent effects of human rights prosecution (which is a super-set of 
prosecutions before ICTs). See generally Kim & Sikkink, supra note 31. 
 67. Id. at 945. For clarity’s sake, this Article distinguishes between formal (or 
legal) (e.g., years in prison or the amount of reparations) and social sanctions (e.g., social 
disapproval, calls for resignation).  
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sanctions. Second, what are the effects of “raising the stakes” for 
individuals confronting the above-said risk calculus? Arguing that it is 
merely a matter of increasing positive and negative payoffs risks 
oversimplifies the complexity of the underlying decision-making 
processes. Indeed, working on the payoff structure can do more than just 
reordering individual preferences; it can also lead to situations whereby 
actors have either no interest in ceasing their criminal activities or even 
an increasing advantage in exacerbating violence.68 It is therefore crucial 
to explore how the Rome Statute, along with the other norms and 
procedures governing the ICC, has amended the legal structure and, in 
turn, individual choices on compliance. 
The third major problem characterizing LDTs is the timing of their 
application. Both general deterrence and specific deterrence theories start 
with the factual premise that a crime has occurred.69 Mainstream legal 
scholarship defines general deterrence as “‘the inhibiting effect of 
sanctions on the criminal activity of people other than the sanctioned 
offender,’”70 while specific deterrence “refers to the discouragement of 
subsequent criminal activity by those who have been punished.”71 For 
restrictive deterrence, future perpetrators look at—and learn from—past 
crimes in order to minimize the severity of legal punishment.72 A 
  
 68. A somewhat similar point is raised in Rothe & Schoultz, supra note 5, at 156. 
For a study of the evolving nature of violence in modern warfare, from military 
instrument to self-serving objective, see MARY KALDOR, NEW AND OLD WARS: 
ORGANIZED VIOLENCE IN A GLOBAL ERA (3rd ed. 2012). For a critique of the current, 
static legal regime applied to evolving methods and means of warfare, see Nicolas Lamp, 
Conceptions of War and Paradigms of Compliance: The ‘New War’ Challenge to 
International Humanitarian Law, 16 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 225 (2011). 
 69. For a review of classical deterrence theories and how they apply to 
international justice, see Alexander, supra note 6; Bosco, supra note 5; Cronin-Furman, 
supra note 12. 
 70. Kim & Sikkink, supra note 31, at 943 (quoting DETERRENCE AND 
INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATE 
(Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., National Academy Press 1978) (emphasis added)).  
 71. Bosco, supra note 5, at 170 (emphasis added). 
 72. Restrictive deterrence has occurred “when, to diminish the risk or severity of 
a legal punishment, a potential offender engages in some action that has the effect of 
reducing his or her commissions of a crime.” Bosco, supra note 5, at 171 (quoting Jack P. 
Gibbs, Deterrence Theory and Research, in THE LAW AS A BEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT: 
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feedback loop is at play in the latter: past crimes inspire new laws, and 
these laws in turn inform the ways and means by which criminals 
commit future crimes.73 Finally, past crimes are integral to the method of 
rational choice in that they provide the raw data upon which potential 
perpetrators compute the probability of being caught and punished. That 
said, international crimes are not ordinary crimes. The grave, widespread 
and systematic nature of the former is such that it would be preferable to 
build on theories that do not require previous crimes of the same kind. In 
the end, the overall epistemological objective is to think international 
legal deterrence anew. Building on international relations scholarship, 
the new task of LDT must be the avoidance of mass atrocities in the first 
place rather than to disincentivize its repetition. 
A. The ICC and its Deterrent Impact: Game Changer or House of 
Cards? 
Unsurprisingly, the idea of establishing the first permanent criminal 
court garnered sizable attention and consensus in both scholarly and 
policy fora well before the court came into being. By the time the Rome 
Statute reached its sixtieth ratification on April 11, 2002, the soon-to-be 
ICC was already portrayed as a game changer.74 The official narrative 
maintained that drafters designed the ICC to end impunity globally.75 
Lofty rhetoric notwithstanding, scholars disagreed—and still disagree, 
albeit to a lesser extent—as to whether the ICC does have such a 
deterrent impact and can therefore fulfill its mission.76 This Article 
maintains that the ICC has remarkably improved the deterrent impact of 
  
NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 87–88 (Gary B. Melton ed., Univ. of Neb. Press 
1986)).  
 73. For a historical account of the above-mentioned feedback loop between law 
and crime, see generally JOHN HAGAN. WHO ARE THE CRIMINALS?: THE POLITICS OF 
CRIME POLICY FROM THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT TO THE AGE OF REAGAN (Princeton 
University Press, 2010). 
 74. See John Washburn, The Negotiation of the Rome Statute for the 
International Criminal Court and International Lawmaking in the 21st Century, 11 PACE 
INT’L L. REV. 361, 361–62 (1999); BOSCO, supra note 10, at 2–4. 
 75. BOSCO, supra note 10, at 3. 
 76. See supra note 3 and accompany text.  
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the ICL regime, and yet it is still insufficient to secure compliance with 
the norms its statute enshrines, let alone to coerce violators into 
compliance in situations of ongoing conflict. That said, this shortcoming 
is not an unfortunate or unforeseen side effect of how ICC operations 
eventually unfolded; the ICC was designed to have a limited deterrent 
impact.77 As already pointed out, the Rome Statute outsourced the 
certainty factor to states.78 Put otherwise, the key factor of a credible 
threat of punishment is exogenous to the ICC. Legal obligation 
notwithstanding, actual state cooperation with the Court hinges on 
political considerations.79 
Historically, it bears recalling that questions about the relationship 
between international prosecutions and the actual deterrence of future 
atrocities long predate the establishment of the ICC. From a brief survey 
of the field, there is no clear agreement as to whether or not ICTs have 
deterred or can deter further atrocities. Julian Ku and Jide Nzelibe 
conclude their large-N quantitative analysis of coup plotter casualties in 
Africa by suggesting that ICTs have no significant deterrent effects on 
future violence.80 According to Charles Villa-Vicencio, achieving peace 
does not necessarily require pursuing criminal prosecution for 
perpetrators; not only are other policy and legal options available, but in 
certain cases, prosecution may even undermine political efforts 
undertaken in hopes of ending violence.81 Linda Keller stresses the 
importance of considering justice mechanisms alternative to international 
prosecution, including non-prosecutorial options.82 Relatedly, upon 
  
 77. On the limits of the ICC’s institutional design, see Bosco, supra note 5, at 
173. 
 78. See supra pp. 367-68, note 56, and accompanying text. 
 79. Sharing the concern that state compliance may hinge upon political 
convenience, see, inter alios, Paola Gaeta, Is the Practice of ‘Self-Referrals’ a Sound 
Start for the ICC?, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 949, 951–52 (2004). For an example of state 
authorities using the ICC instrumentally, see Sarah M.H. Nouwen and Wouter G. 
Werner, Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and 
Sudan, 21 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 941, 949 (2010). 
 80. Ku & Nzelibe, supra note 3, at 831–32. 
 81. Charles Villa-Vicencio, Why Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted: 
Where the International Criminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L.J. 
205, 209 (2000). 
 82. Keller, supra note 27, at 210–11. 
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examining thirty-two civil conflicts and how they eventually came to an 
end, Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri found that “successful” post-
conflict stories more often than not envisaged amnesties for past abusers; 
with specific regard to criminal prosecutions, they emphasized the 
importance of institutional capacity in explaining successes and failures 
of criminal prosecutions across cases.83 In separate articles, Diba Majzub 
and James Meernik challenge the normatively appealing assumption that 
peace and justice can be achieved together, questioning whether it is 
correct to conceive the latter as a necessary condition of the former.84 
David Wippman is agnostic on whether ICTs exert deterrent effects onto 
potential criminals.85 On one hand, he laments that deterrence “is at best 
a plausible but largely untested assumption”;86 on the other hand, he 
concludes that “the general deterrent effect of [international] 
prosecutions seems likely to be modest and incremental, rather than 
dramatic and transformative.”87 Theodor Meron and Payam Akhavan 
shared Wippman’s view that more empirical evidence is still needed 
before claims about deterrence can be trusted.88 Finally, Hun Joon Kim 
and Kathryn Sikkink found support for the claim that human rights 
prosecutions (a superset of international prosecution) hold deterrence 
effects across borders.89 
Proponents of deterrence through international prosecutions are 
somewhat more optimistic when discussing the ICC as opposed to ICTs 
altogether. Through a more refined literature review, I identified four 
macro categories of arguments scholars and professionals use to support 
  
 83. Jack L. Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principles and 
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, INT’L SEC. Winter 2003/04, at 5, 18–
20, 25. 
 84. Diba Majzub, Peace or Justice? Amnesties and the International Criminal 
Court, 3 MELB. J. INT'L L. 247, 248-49 (2002); James Meernik, Justice and Peace? How 
the International Criminal Tribunal Affects Societal Peace in Bosnia, 42 J. OF PEACE RES. 
271, 271-73 (2005). 
 85. Wippman, supra note 1, at 474. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 488. 
 88. Theodor Meron, From Nuremberg to the Hague, 149 MIL. L. REV. 107, 110 
(1995); Akhavan, supra note 12, at 744. 
 89. Kim & Sikkink, supra note 31, at 939. 
378 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 24.2  
 
their claims. First, drafters have purposely conveyed much of the 
experience and jurisprudence developed by other ICTs into the Rome 
Statute.90 Put otherwise, the Rome Statute was instrumental in codifying 
many legal and jurisprudential novelties previously adopted in the 
statutes and case law of other ICTs. In so doing, the Rome Statute 
became the key tool for enhancing consistency in the application of ICL 
across cases and over time.91 Drafters took another bold decision for the 
sake of consistency during negotiations, as they forbade reservations to 
the treaty.92 Candidates for membership confront the sheer choice of 
either becoming a party or not. Relatedly, prohibiting reservations entails 
that, unlike in most other multilateral treaties, all state parties carry equal 
legal obligations. Crafting the Rome Statute in such a way has had two 
main consequences. Politically, the enterprise of establishing the first 
permanent ICT brought about radical change in the leadership of the 
overall ICL project.93 The United States, whose patronage was critical to 
kicking off the two ad hoc tribunals just a few years earlier, never 
concealed its aversion to a number of provisions that nonetheless made 
the final draft.94 The United Kingdom and France took over the role of 
ICL “champions” at the global level.95 Ratification of the Rome Statute 
has become the main proxy used to gauge state commitment to the ICL 
  
 90. See Washburn, supra note 74, at 365. 
 91. For a similar concern (but expressed from a different perspective), see Avril 
McDonald, Sierra Leone’s Shoestring Special Court, 84 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 
121, 137 (2002). 
 92. “[N]o reservations are allowed (Article 120), but a state party may opt out of 
the provision giving the ICC jurisdiction over war crimes for a period of seven years 
(Article 124).” Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22, 41–42 (1999). 
 93. BOSCO, supra note 10, at 43–44. 
 94. For a discussion on claims to American exceptionalism vis-à-vis the ICL 
regime, see HAGAN, supra note 9, at 96, 206; MARK MAZOWER, GOVERNING THE WORLD: 
THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 400–01, 404 (2012). 
 95. BOSCO, supra note 10, at 43–44. Regarding the notion of “champion,” I use it 
as a synonym for John Hagan’s notion of “hero.” HAGAN, supra note 9, at 106. Hagan 
puts forward a sociological explanation whereby different actors (states, in this case) 
compete for the status of “hero.” Id. This status is bestowed upon the moral agent “who 
will bear the potential risk costs . . . to undertake the idealized behavior that may result in 
obtaining the status of ‘hero.’” Id. 
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regime.96 The second consequence directly concerns the deterrent impact 
of the ICC. A Latin maxim says: Nullum crimen sine praevia lege. For 
the fear of punishment to deter crimes, the logical and temporal premise 
is that potential perpetrators know beforehand which conduct is 
forbidden and which the law permits. Clarity in the law is thus a 
necessary precondition for legal deterrence to work properly.97 
Clarity in the law is intimately intertwined with both the second and 
third broad arguments topics researchers point to when claiming that the 
ICC has improved the chances of legal deterrence at the international 
level: ICC’s temporal and territorial jurisdiction. Unlike other ICTs 
(including the two ad hoc tribunals, the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia), the ICC is mandated to investigate and try 
crimes that have occurred since its entry into force.98 On this point, 
Eamon Aloyo, Yvonne Dutton, and Lindsay Heger hold that “[t]he ad 
hoc tribunals have no such general forwardǦlooking deterrent effect: 
although there may have been a limited deterrent effect with the ICTY, 
they were created after atrocities began and their jurisdiction is limited to 
dealing with those.”99 Likewise, Kate Cronin-Furman maintains that, by 
virtue of its “potentially unlimited geographic . . . and prospective 
temporal jurisdiction,” the ICC “represents the most likely institution for 
triggering a deterrent effect.”100 In all, there is strong consensus on the 
proposition that ICC’s jurisdiction enhances the chances for legal 
deterrence to constrain criminal behavior and thus prevent atrocities. 
But the ICC has accomplished far more than simply collecting and 
enshrining a broad array of legal norms and customs into a single 
document. The fourth and last category of arguments about the ICC’s 
  
 96. See, e.g., Beth A. Simmons & Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and 
the International Criminal Court, 64 INT’L ORG. 225, 234 (2010). 
 97. For a discussion on the increased clarity in the ICL regime as a result of the 
Rome Statute, see SIKKINK, supra note 44, at 97, 199. 
 98. Eamon Aloyo et al., Does the International Criminal Court Deter Torture? 
7–8 (March 27, 2013) (unpublished draft manuscript) (on file with One Earth Future 
Foundation), available at http://oneearthfuture.org/sites/oneearthfuture.org/files// 
documents/publications/ICC-and-Torture_working-paper.pdf. 
 99. Id. at 8 (emphasis added); see also Alexander, supra note 6, at 3. 
 100. Cronin-Furman, supra note 12, at 441. 
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enhanced deterrent potential groups together studies of both the legal 
novelties introduced in the Rome Statute and their spillover effects on 
the relations between the Court and state parties.101The common 
denominator of these studies is the unprecedented (legal and political) 
flexibility bestowed upon the ICC, in particular, the discretion managed 
by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).102 As I demonstrate below, this 
flexibility is at once the key to overcoming limits inherent to LDT and 
the reason for which ICC experts should draw on international relations 
(IR) theory for guidance on how to actually put it to use. Domestically, 
researchers face at least two intertwined problems. First, the logic of 
deterrence dictates a dichotomous categorization of human behaviors. 
One action is either lawful or not; there can be no intermediate ground 
between these two opposites. Second, it is possible to tell only when 
deterrence fails, while compliance does not afford observers to set forth 
causal claims on the inhibiting power of sanctions. Internationally, the 
Rome Statute envisages the “gravity threshold,”103 which categorizes 
criminal activity along a continuum: from unworthy to worthy of 
international judicial scrutiny.104 This change in categorization has 
  
 101. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 102. See infra, note 103 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Kevin Jon Heller, Situational Gravity Under the Rome Statute, in FUTURE 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 32, 34 (Carsten Stahn & Larissa van 
den Herik eds., 2010); Susana SáCouto & Katherine Cleary, The Gravity Threshold of the 
International Criminal Court, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 807, 811 (2008); Wasana 
Punyasena, Conflict Prevention and the International Criminal Court: Deterrence in a 
Changing World, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 39, 50 (2006); Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The 
Gravity Threshold Under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 19 CRIM. L.F. 
35, 45–50 (2008). In all, prosecutorial discretion at the ICC level pivots on two ill-
defined notions, namely the “interest of justice” and the “gravity threshold.” SáCouto & 
Cleary, supra at 808. At first glance, the latter is to be regarded as an indicator of the 
former. Put otherwise, if the gravity threshold is met, then it is in the interest of justice to 
investigate that case. For an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the “interests of 
justice” and the “gravity threshold.” See Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of 
Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court, 14 Eur. J. 
OF INT’L L. 481, 481–93 (2003); Akhavan, supra note 13, at 633 n.19. 
 104. The gravity threshold is a multifaceted concept that entails—but is by no 
means limited to—considerations on the quantity of violence already perpetrated at any 
time during an ongoing conflict and/or episode of mass violence. That being said, the 
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created a grey zone—no matter how narrowly or broadly conceived—
where the OTP can intervene in order to prevent the escalation, rather 
than the commission, of atrocities.105 On the issue of causality, the mere 
existence of the sanctioning regime set forth in the Rome Statute has 
enabled researchers to distinguish between decisions driven by normative 
concerns and rationalist calculations of expected utility.106 Relatedly, the 
ICC’s legal flexibility affords a practical expedient to observe the 
deterrent effects of threats on compliance, thus overcoming Nick 
Grono’s concerns on the empirical limitations of testing LDT.107 The idea 
is to examine cases wherein the underlying offense or conduct is 
negative.108 For the purpose of this Article, an offense or conduct is 
negative when the perpetrator has already undertaken illicit action at the 
time the threat of prosecution intervenes, and following which he must 
stop in order to avoid sanctions. A recurring example in ICL case law is 
the instigation to commit atrocities.109 
  
quantum of violence tolerated is the most salient aspect for the argument set forth in this 
Article. 
 105. See generally Akhavan, supra note 13, at 633. See also Song, supra note 7, at 
207–08. 
 106. Aloyo et al., supra note 98, at 7–8, 14. Here the authors found that state 
parties to the Rome Statute are less likely to commit torture than states that have ratified 
the Convention Against Torture (CAT) but not the Rome Statute. Id. at 6. This finding, 
they argue, is due to the fact that, while both treaties forbid torture, the CAT does not 
provide for criminal sanctions, whereas the Rome Statute does. Id. at 13–14. 
 107. Nick Grono, The Deterrent Effect of the ICC on the Commission of 
International Crimes by Government Leaders, INT’L CRISIS GRP. (Oct. 5, 2012),  
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2012/grono-the-deterrent-effect-
of-the-icc.aspx. 
 108. This practical expedient is meant to address the methodological concerns of 
maximizing concreteness. According to Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, 
“[w]e should choose observable, rather than unobservable, concepts whenever possible. . 
. . [For the latter] can be a hindrance to empirical evaluation of theories and hypotheses.” 
GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE 
RESEARCH 109 (1994). 
 109. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the main—albeit not the exclusive—conduct 
examined is instigation (or incitement) to commit atrocities through state-owned or state-
controlled media by senior political leaders. On this point, see Straus, supra note 61, at 
484. Choosing instigation to commit atrocities offers another advantage, as it allows 
comparative analysis across cases and over time. Indeed, other cases of instigation to 
commit atrocities include Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and more 
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Unsurprisingly, the number of researchers deserving membership in 
this fourth category has increased dramatically over the past few years. 
Moreover, the debate on the ICC deterrent impact is not exclusively for 
scholars; former and current professionals actively participate therein, 
bringing in valuable insight on the Court’s internal dynamics and 
operations. Wasana Punyasena and Payam Akhavan, for instance, are 
among those who have stressed the legal novelties introduced by the 
Rome Statute, and how these in turn enhance the ICC deterrent impact.110 
Song, as said earlier, argues that the ICC preventive potential is by no 
means limited to deterring future crimes.111 In his account, the threat of 
ICC prosecution also affects short-term decision-making processes.112 
Public statements, arrest warrants and formal indictments issued by the 
OTP have the potential to dissuade potential criminals from engaging in 
imminent unlawful behavior.113 These authors correctly agree and insist 
that the ICC has a specific role to play in ongoing conflicts. According to 
them, the ICC should work toward preventing the escalation of atrocities 
within the broader conflict setting.114 What these authors lack, I claim, is 
a theoretical framework on which to apply the novelties envisaged by in 
the Rome Statute and the following practices developed by the OTP. 
Thence stems the need for importing the concept of immediate 
deterrence into the legal debate. 
Other authors interestingly investigate the relations between the ICC 
and state parties. Fully aware that the Court lacks teeth to enforce its own 
decisions, their work aims to shift the burden of apprehending and trying 
suspects onto domestic actors. On one hand, their understanding of ICC-
  
recently Kenya. See generally Gregory S. Gordon, Formulating a New Atrocity Speech 
Offense: Incitement to Commit War Crimes, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 281 (2012). For a more 
critical view of the role played by the media in inciting atrocity crimes, see generally 
Scott Straus, What Is the Relationship between Hate Radio and Violence? Rethinking 
Rwanda’s “Radio Machete”, 35 POL. & SOC’Y 609 (2007). 
 110. Punyasena, supra note 103, at 68–69. See generally Akhavan, supra note 13. 
 111. Song, supra note 7, at 207–08. 
 112. Id. at 208. 
 113. Id.; see also Bosco, supra note 5, at 181. 
 114. On the ICC’s ambitious role in conflict prevention and management, see 
generally Akhavan, supra note 13; Song, supra note 7; Punyasena, supra note 103; 
Vinjamuri, supra note 44. 
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state parties relations is wedded to a traditional principal-agent logic; on 
the other hand, they switch the Court’s position, making it an agent 
instrumental to the successful domestic prosecution of international 
crimes. Since these scholarly accounts build on the same cornerstone, 
i.e., the principle of complementarity, the most salient difference among 
them lies in whether ICC and state interests converge or not. Anne-Marie 
Slaughter and William Burke-White reject the traditional distinction 
between international and domestic law as outdated.115 According to 
them, it is no longer possible to consider these two sets of rules to be 
disconnected.116 International law, in particular, “has penetrated the once 
exclusive zone of domestic affairs to regulate the relationships between 
governments and their own citizens, particularly through the growing 
bodies of human rights law and international criminal law.”117 Within 
this ongoing process of reshaping the boundaries between international 
and domestic law, Burke-White advocates for what he calls “proactive 
complementarity.”118 Not only does the ICC defer to state jurisdiction, 
but it could also “encourage and at times assist states in undertaking 
domestic prosecutions of international crimes.”119 Complementarity can 
also be used when ICC and state interests diverge at the outset. James 
Alexander’s notion of “complementary deterrence” is meant to pressure 
state authorities to fulfill their obligations under the Rome Statute.120 The 
logic at play is that the OTP observes what action governments take 
domestically and, if state response does not meet international standards 
of justice, invokes the complementarity principle, and summons the 
investigation to The Hague. Through this mechanism, Alexander 
  
 115. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International 
Law Is Domestic (or, the European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 327, 327 (2006). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International 
Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 54 (2008) (emphasis added).  
 119. Id. at 53.  
 120. Alexander, supra note 6, at 20–22. 
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contends, “the ICC can exert leverage over governments that might 
otherwise fail to investigate or prosecute grave crimes.”121  
All in all, the establishment and entry into force of the ICC 
represented a watershed moment for the international criminal justice 
system as a whole. As so many authors have pointed out, the threat of 
ICC prosecution has the potential to affect individual decision-making 
processes. Potential perpetrators should know that certain conducts are 
no longer tolerated and, if they decide to ignore ICC provisions, they 
face the risk of prosecution before it. ICC’s temporal and territorial 
jurisdiction amounts to a necessary precondition for potential criminals 
to perceive the threat of punishment. Additionally, the ICC can intervene 
in ongoing conflicts and prevent the escalation of violence, although it is 
not yet clear what strategy the Court should adopt to succeed in this 
task.122 ICC’s enhanced deterrent impact is a function of its greater legal 
and political flexibility vis-à-vis other ICTs.123 The gravity threshold and 
interest of justice norms enable the OTP to escape the rigid logic of RDT 
and adjust ICC response to the level of violence unleashed.124 Relatedly, 
the OTP has developed internal strategies on how to liaise with national 
governments for the aim of spawning (or, if necessary, soliciting) 
cooperation by the latter.125 These improvements notwithstanding, it 
would be mistaken to forget that the Rome Statute has outsourced 
enforcement to state actors. Lacking teeth to enforce its own decisions, 
  
 121. Id. A good first case for testing Alexander’s argument might be Guinea. 
Unlike in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinean state authorities announced their willingness to work 
along with the Court and carry out genuine investigations (and eventually prosecutions) 
against those who committed, ordered or anyhow aided and abetted the perpetration of 
violence against civilians in the fall of 2009. Id. Criminal liability of members of the 
military junta ruling the country is very likely, if not certain. Id. One possible (political) 
explanation as to why Guinean state authorities have agreed to cooperate with the ICC is 
that the potential enforcer is—as in Côte d’Ivoire—France. See id. 
 122. See Song, supra note 7, at 208. 
 123. See generally supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 125. For example, see Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the 
Prosecutor, ICC-OTP, 2, 8 (Sept. 2003), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/ 
rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_Policy_ 
Paper.pdf. 
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the ICC has virtually no means to improve the certainty factor and, in 
turn, the deterrent impact of threatening international sanctions. 
II. ARMING THE THREAT OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS: LESSONS ON 
DETERRENCE FROM INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IR) THEORY. 
“The principle of deterrence is as old as history.”  
– Henry Trofimenko 126  
 
“Deterrence theory . . . is probably the most influential school of 
thought in the American study of international relations.”  
– Robert Jervis127 
 
I have heretofore argued that domestic LDTs are ill equipped to 
explain what determines whether or not the ICC will deter potential 
criminals. Their main flaw, I claim, is that they overlook, if not 
completely ignore, the coercion lying at the core of any threats. Yet law 
scholars have long noticed that “[i]t is the credible threat of the use of 
force that becomes the primary weapon in deterrence theory.”128 Even 
Rudolph, an author whose scholarship reaches across disciplines, points 
at IR theory when listing the ingredients for deterrence to work 
effectively.129 As a result, one of the purposes of this section is to bring 
considerations of power back in.130 But reintroducing the coercive aspect 
of deterrence theory is still insufficient. As for the broader concept of 
power, deterrence is also relational. Domestically, deterrence runs 
  
 126. Henry Trofimenko, Changing Attitudes Toward Deterrence, in NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY 65, 65 (Bernard Brodie et al. eds., 1983). 
 127. Deterrence Theory Revisited, supra note 47, at 289. 
 128. Smidt, supra note 3, at 167. 
 129. According to Christopher Rudolph, “[e]ffective deterrence requires three 
elements—commitment, capability and credibility.” Rudolph, supra note 17, at 684. 
 130. Adapting Robert Dahl’s famous definition of power, deterrence can be 
considered the negative face of the same capacity by which A gets B to do something B 
would otherwise not do. Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCI. 201, 202 
(1957). Similarly, Thomas Schelling conceptualizes coercion as a category including its 
two specular faces, namely compellence and deterrence. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS 
AND INFLUENCE 69–78 (1966). 
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between the state and the individual perpetrator, with the state 
performing the dual role of threatener and enforcer. At the international 
level, however, the ICC threatens only, while a state (or a coalition of 
states) acts as enforcer. Thus, it is necessary to pay due attention to the 
enforcer, that is, to the actor who is the protagonist of this coercive 
relation.  
All that said, this section is organized as follows. First, I introduce the 
notions of immediate and extended deterrence, and I explain why these 
further our understanding of the ICC’s preventive potential. Next, I argue 
why the assumption of perfect information made by RDT must be 
relaxed; the threat of ICC prosecution should be interpreted a signal and, 
as such, it must be clearly sent and correctly decoded in order to convey 
its message. Third, I lay out a typology of the strategies that states fallen 
under ICC scrutiny can adopt. Lastly, I advocate for a better 
understanding of African politics. To date, there is in fact no correlation 
between the attention paid to the African continent by the ICC and the 
knowledge of power dynamics therein. With eight countries under 
investigation and two more preliminary examinations waiting, it is about 
time that the ICC—and the OTP in particular—sharpens its 
comprehension of how politics is carried out in Africa. 
A. New Concepts for Old Theories: Immediate and Extended 
Deterrence 
Deterrence theory is by definition a terrain for academic cross-
fertilization. I already pointed out that no discipline can claim exclusive 
ownership of deterrence, for scholars from different social sciences have 
contributed to its study. Against this backdrop, it is somewhat puzzling 
to understand why political science scholarship on deterrence stands 
alone within the broader scholarly debate. At a glance, it might be a 
“problem” of different units of analysis; LDT looks at individuals, 
whereas IR theory focuses on states. However, this argument shall be 
cast aside, as the field of ICL offers a unique opportunity to bring 
together these two scholarships. What is needed, I contend, is a hybrid 
theoretical framework that incorporates both units of the analysis so as to 
apply to one specific category of subjects: domestic decision-makers. 
The underlying logic pivots on the Janus-faced nature of these subjects, 
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who can be threatened of individual sanctions in order to forestall 
decisions that affect society as a whole. Thus, the chosen unit of analysis 
is different from IR theory in that responsibility for collective action is 
now individualized, while beforehand there was no assumption that 
decision-makers had to suffer personally from the consequences of their 
decisions. Likewise, the same unit of analysis differs from LDT in that, 
unlike the average citizen, domestic decision-makers have a collective 
dimension by virtue of their position within civilian or military 
bureaucracies. That said, the establishment of the ICC calls for further 
adaptation of this hybrid framework. There are two concepts that I deem 
worth importing from IR theory into the study of ICC’s preventive 
impact. The first is immediate deterrence,131 which resonates well with 
the gravity threshold principle envisaged by the Rome Statute and can 
potentially inform OTP strategies aimed at preventing the escalation of 
violence. The second is extended deterrence,132 which applies to the 
distinction between threatener and enforcer that I set forth. 
Legal scholars such as Song and Akhavan argue that the threat of ICC 
prosecution can prevent—and has prevented—domestic actors from 
escalating violence into mass murder.133 Similarly, David Bosco 
discusses the OTP’s strategy to “prevent . . . violent scenario[s] from 
occurring through public statements and warnings directed at political or 
ethnic leaders.”134 From these accounts stems the need for a theory 
linking up ICC provisions and practices. I propose a framework whereby 
the gravity threshold provides the OTP with a temporal window for 
intervention—a temporal window running from no violence at all until 
the gravity threshold is finally met. OTP intervention can take many 
forms, including public statements, indictments, and arrest warrants. This 
is not to say that OTP response is random; as violence increases, so does 
OTP response. The underlying logic—which is not new to IR theory—is 
  
 131. On the concept of immediate deterrence, see generally Paul K. Huth, 
Reputations and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment, 7 SEC. STUD. 72 
(1997).  
 132. On the concept of extended deterrence, see generally PAUL K. HUTH, 
EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND THE PREVENTION OF WAR (1991). 
 133. Song, supra note 7, at 207–08; Akhavan, supra note 13, at 625, 636. 
 134. Bosco, supra note 5, at 171. 
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to match the level of violence with the severity of threat.135 Immediate 
deterrence hereby represents the causal mechanism connecting the 
violence perpetrated at any given moment to OTP response within the 
limited temporal window afforded by the gravity threshold. On this 
point, it is worth noting that political scientists conceive immediate 
deterrence as the alternative to general deterrence.136 In Paul Huth’s 
words, “[g]eneral deterrence refers to a policy which seeks to prevent a 
state from issuing a military threat to change the status quo, while 
immediate deterrence refers to a policy which attempts to prevent a state, 
which has already threatened force, from initiating the large-scale use of 
force.”137 Put otherwise, the latter applies to existing crises, while the 
former does not.138 For both political scientists and legal scholars, general 
deterrence is characterized by logical (and legal) rigidity, which justifies 
the dichotomous coding of human deeds into either lawful or unlawful. 
In conclusion, immediate deterrence amounts to a causal framework that 
accommodates—and even endorses—ICC legal flexibility, while general 
deterrence is not engineered to do likewise. 
The second concept worth importing from IR theory is that of 
extended deterrence. Political scientists describe it as a situation wherein 
“one major power (defender) attempts to deter another (challenger) from 
starting or continuing a conflict involving a third party (protégé).”139 This 
  
 135. David Gompert interestingly applies the concept of “escalation dominance” 
to situations of humanitarian intervention, whereby the primary objective is to stop mass 
atrocities (also) by coercive means. David C. Gompert, For a Capability to Protect: Mass 
Killing, the African Union and NATO, 48 SURVIVAL 7, 13 (2006). It bears recalling that 
escalation dominance usually refers to the military ability of state A to threaten state B 
with overwhelming retaliation in order to deter B from responding to A’s use of force. 
This definition is adapted from Gareth Porter, Escalation Dominance, RIGHT WEB,  
http://rightweb.irc-online.org/articles/display/Escalation_Dominance (last updated Sept. 
27, 2007). 
 136. See Huth, supra note 131, at 83 n.10. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Interestingly, later in the same article Paul K. Huth refers to general 
deterrence as a theory that applies to “crisis initiation,” and to immediate deterrence as 
addressing “crisis escalation.” Id. at 97. 
 139. Vesna Danilovic, The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence, 
45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 341, 351 (2001); see also Huth, supra note 131, at 83; HUTH, 
supra note 132, at 16. 
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framework suggests that greater attention is necessary in identifying the 
source of threat. When applying the same framework to the ICC, we 
should therefore ask whom potential perpetrators actually fear: the ICC 
or those enforcing its decisions? This adaptation holds the ICC in the 
same manner as a major power’s protégé—which is exactly what 
happened in Côte d’Ivoire when France took on the role of enforcer.140 
By unleashing violence domestically, Ivorian leaders challenged ICC 
proscriptions.141 Since the latter had no enforcement power, it was 
France’s task to deter them. While extended deterrence envisages (at 
least) three players involved in the threat game, it is the interplay 
between challenger and defender that determines the success or failure of 
deterrence; the protégé, on the other hand, cannot alter the balance of 
power in a significant way. Many authors have stressed the need for a 
framework that incorporates the coercive dimension of deterrence.142 Yet, 
extended deterrence does more than merely reintroducing coercion into 
the equation. It builds on and speaks to Kenneth Waltz’s balance of 
power,143 Stephen Walt’s balance of threat,144 and Robert Jervis’ balance 
of interest.145 It does so by encompassing realist considerations of power, 
  
 140. I hereby refer to Opération Licorne (French for Operation Unicorn), a French 
peacekeeping mission deployed in Côte d’Ivoire in late September 2002. For general 
information about Opération Licorne, see Operation Unicorn, WIKIPEDIA (Jan. 22, 2015, 
11:45 PM), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Unicorn. 
 141. On the patterns of violence observed during the first Ivorian civil war, see 
Daniel Chirot, The Debacle in Côte d’Ivoire, 17 J. DEMOCRACY 63, 71–74 (2006); 
Akhavan, supra note 13, at 636–41. Regarding the second Ivorian civil war, see Straus, 
supra note 61, at 483–87; Bellamy & Williams, supra note 61, at 829–38. 
 142. According to Michael Smidt, for instance, “[t]he military remains the most 
credible and effective form of deterrence in the international arsenal of weapons to 
prevent war and massive human rights abuses.” Smidt, supra note 3, at 157. Similarly, 
Kenneth Rodman maintains that “broader deterrent ambitions are dependent upon the 
capability and willingness of powerful states to back them up.” Kenneth A. Rodman, 
Darfur and the Limits of Legal Deterrence, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 529, 560 (2008). 
 143. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 117–18 (1979). 
 144. See generally STEPHEN M. WALT, THE ORIGINS OF ALLIANCES (Cornell Univ. 
Press 1987). 
 145. See generally ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Princeton Univ. Press 1976); see also Deterrence Theory 
Revisited, supra note 47, at 314–15; Randall L. Schweller, Bandwagoning for Profit: 
Bringing the Revisionist State Back In, 19 INT’L SECURITY 72, 99–100 (1994).  
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the projection thereof across world regions, state interest on both sides, 
structural factors such as geographical proximity, and past interactions 
between challenger and defender. 
B. Beyond Rational Deterrence Theory: Signaling the Threat of 
Sanctions to Potential Atrocities Perpetrators 
I mentioned earlier that RDT is mainstream in legal scholarship.146 
Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to hold that virtually all legal scholars 
view deterrence through the lens of RDT and, in turn, employ rationalist 
tenets when designing alternative theories on the same topic. I also stated 
that several assumptions underlying RDT have been uncritically applied 
to the ICL regime despite the remarkable differences between domestic 
and international criminal justice.147 One of these assumptions posits that 
players have perfect information of the pay-off structure—perfect 
information that amounts to the logical premise for calculating the pros 
and cons of violating the law, hence deciding whether or not it is worth 
incurring risks of sanctions. The assumption of perfect information 
resonates well with another assumption that has always characterized 
domestic criminal justice systems: ignorance of the law neither affords 
nor excuses criminal deeds.148 Put otherwise, all are presumed to know 
that criminal law forbids certain conducts, and thus, they are required to 
behave accordingly. The Rome Statute lists the unlawful actions that 
qualify as the actus reus of an international crime. In doing so, it surely 
improved the knowledgeability of ICL proscriptions. Still, the 
assumption of perfect information is misleading for theorizing 
international deterrence, as it neither helps to explain variation in 
outcomes across cases or over time nor does it apply to the source of 
threat. Empirically, new episodes of mass violence have broken out since 
July 1, 2002, despite the looming specter of accountability for 
international crimes. This observation presents a puzzle for those who 
posit that the mere existence of the ICC can deter atrocities. Clearly, we 
should look elsewhere for the factor(s) causing deterrence to succeed in 
  
 146. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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coercing compliance. By looking at deterrence through the lens of IR 
theory, we realize that the latter is a function of the specific relationship 
between challenger and defender (hereby relabeled threatened and 
enforcer). Conceptually, it follows that the ICC is a trivial condition—a 
necessary condition retaining very little explanatory power about the 
observed outcome. Methodologically, the ICC is to be held constant 
when comparing cases occurred after July 1, 2002 and, as a constant, it 
cannot be a source of causal inference. All in all, it is fair to conclude 
that the mere existence of the ICC has had little to no impact on the 
deterrence of future atrocities. 
For political scientists, deterrence is relational; its success hinges on 
the interaction between players and, in particular, on how the threatened 
decodes the threat conveyed by the enforcer. Such a framework calls for 
a theory that does not assume perfect information: signal theory. The 
threat of sanctions can fail to deter because of how the threatened 
misperceives the threat. The threatened can interpret the signal in the 
context of past experiences, inherent biases, personal/historical traumas, 
etc.149 But deterrence can also fail because of the enforcer. For instance, 
the threat the enforcer sends can appear inconsistent with his stated 
interests or past actions, resulting in a signal that seems incoherent (or 
weak) in the eye of the threatened. That said, the question this section 
purports to answer is how to convey a strong signal—a signal that 
successfully deters the receiver from committing atrocious crimes. While 
a complete survey of the literature on deterrence in IR theory is beyond 
the scope of this article, I draw heavily on this literature for the analytical 
framework I set forth below. Building on Jervis’ work, I distinguish 
between the pre-bargaining phase, which is defined by state (and 
statesmen’s) interests, and the bargaining phase, which pivots on the 
central concept of commitment.150 I also divide state interests into 
intrinsic and strategic, while I disaggregate the broad concept of 
commitment as to examine the ways and factors that make it credible in 
  
 149. See Robert Jervis, Hypotheses on Misperception, 20 WORLD POL. 454, 467–
69 (1968); see also JERVIS, supra note 145.  
 150. Robert Jervis identifies both state interests and commitment in a deductive 
negative manner by looking at who will lose if it retreats. Deterrence Theory Revisited, 
supra note 47, at 314. 
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the eye of the threatened. Notions like coercive capability and reputation 
belong mostly, albeit not exclusively, to the bargaining phase and, as 
such, they will be dealt with and placed under the overarching umbrella 
of commitment. 
According to Jervis, state interests are the logical foundation upon 
which commitment can be built during the bargaining phase.151 Within 
the distinction between intrinsic and strategic interests, he adds that the 
former lead to the latter.152 Put otherwise, “intrinsic interest represents 
the inherent value that the actor places on the object or issue at stake.”153 
In this Article I maintain that France acted as the main enforcer in Côte 
d’Ivoire, which raises the question of what was France’s intrinsic interest 
in intervening in its former colony. On this point, it is fair to say that 
Paris had a two-fold interest in taking action. First, French decision-
makers conceived of intervention not only as a means of retaining 
political and economic influence in the domestic affairs just in Côte 
d’Ivoire, but also in all former African colonies.154 Second, Paris had an 
interest in presenting itself as the ICC champion, especially in light of 
the United Kingdom’s hesitancy to become militarily involved in Africa 
during the late stages of the Sierra Leonean civil conflict.155 This brief 
  
 151. Id. at 315.  
 152. Id. at 314. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Foreign policy experts have already stressed that France holds a strong 
interest in maintaining its special role in Africa:  
[France’s] engagements with African states have played an important role 
in sustaining its image as a major power. African countries can be a 
valuable source of supportive votes at the UN and they have been key 
allies for France and fellow EU members in international negotiations on 
certain global issues, notably climate change.  
Paul Melly & Vincent Darracq, A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from 
Sarkozy to Hollande, CHATHAM HOUSE 3 (2013),  
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0513pp_
franceafrica.pdf. Moreover, according to Maja Bovcon, Côte d’Ivoire’s dependence on 
French military assistance was—and still is—the desired consequence of the former 
metropole’s foreign policy. Maja Bovcon, France’s Conflict Resolution Strategy in Côte 
d’Ivoire and its Ethical Implications, 11 AFR. STUD. Q. 1, 9 (2009).  
 155. For an account of the British military intervention in Sierra Leone, see Paul 
Williams, Fighting for Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone, 22 
CONTEMP. SECURITY POL’Y 140 (2001). For an assessment of British military and 
 
2016] Coercing Compliance with the ICC 393 
 
investigation of French intrinsic interest is instrumental in pinpointing 
French strategic interest in Côte d’Ivoire.  
According to Jervis, “[s]trategic interest in a conflict represents the 
degree to which a retreat would endanger the state’s position on other 
issues, irrespective of its efforts to commit itself to a firm stand.”156 On 
this point, it is easy to speculate that, had it not intervened in Côte 
d’Ivoire, France would have undermined its influence in the African 
continent and, consequently, its status as a major power in world 
politics.157 From a symbolic standpoint, another compelling reason to 
intervene stemmed from considerations of what Côte d’Ivoire 
represented in France’s post-colonial foreign policy. Under Felix 
Houphouët-Boigny’s rule, Côte d’Ivoire was internationally recognized 
for its economic success; global actors openly suggested that other 
African countries should look at and learn from the Ivorian model so as 
to achieve solid economic growth and boost industrial capacity.158 Côte 
d’Ivoire, indeed, stood as the epitome of post-colonial Franco-African 
relations, whereby former colonies consented to—and even welcomed—
French interference in their internal affairs and earned political stability 
and economic development as a result thereof.159 In return for its 
  
financial commitment to Sierra Leone in 2000, see ANDREW M. DORMAN, BLAIR’S 
SUCCESSFUL WAR: BRITISH MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SIERRA LEONE 66 (Ashgate 
Publ’g Ltd. 2009). 
 156. Deterrence Theory Revisited, supra note 47, at 314. 
 157. On French struggles to maintain the status of major power, see Shaun 
Gregory, The French Military in Africa: Past and Present, 99 AFR. AFF. 435, 436 (2000); 
see also Rachel Utley, ‘Not to Do Less but to Do Better...’: French Military Policy in 
Africa, 78 INT’L AFF. 129, 129–30 (2002). On this point, Jean-François Bayart 
commented that “[r]elations between France and its former possessions[] [looked] 
surprisingly ‘neo-colonial’ in the eyes of anglophone observers.” JEAN-FRANÇOIS 
BAYART, THE STATE IN AFRICA: THE POLITICS OF THE BELLY 26 (2d ed. 2009). 
 158. On Côte d’Ivoire as a model for other African countries, see LAUREN M. 
MACLEAN, INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND CITIZENSHIP IN RURAL AFRICA: RISK AND 
RECIPROCITY IN GHANA AND COTE D’IVOIRE 3 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010); PAUL 
COLLIER, WARS, GUNS AND VOTES: DEMOCRACY IN DANGEROUS PLACES 155 (Harper 
Collins 2009); Chirot, supra note 141, at 63. 
 159. Shaun Gregory defines this system of enduring dependence from France as a 
“virtual empire.” Gregory, supra note 157. Christopher Clapham observes that, “in the 
case of African states, survival was best assured by a state firmly attaching itself to a 
great power ally or protector.” See also CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM, AFRICA AND THE 
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patronage, the former metropole successfully reinforced its lasting 
hierarchical understanding of the international system—an understanding 
that is reminiscent of David Lake’s conceptualization (and measurement) 
of hierarchy.160 In all, it is worth noting that state interest does more than 
lay the foundations of a credible commitment, as “when interest is great 
enough, commitment is not necessary.”161 Because “‘[p]olitical patterns 
are prerequisite to military deterrent success,’”162 it is possible to 
hypothesize that, bearing in mind France’s special interests in Côte 
d’Ivoire and in supporting the ICC, Ivorian leaders would have judged 
the threat of intervention as credible regardless of a later commitment.  
Once intrinsic and strategic interests are identified, the main issue 
becomes how to signal what they mean to potential perpetrators. In this 
regard, James Fearon suggests “states attempt to resolve this dilemma . . . 
by making their threats costly signals.”163 Logically, the enforcer’s 
ultimate goal is credibility when threatening the use of force without 
actually having to carry out his threat. According to Fearon, the proper 
way to add credibility to threats is to incur or create costs the enforcer 
would not bear if he were unwilling to carry out those threats.164 To this 
end, Fearon sets forth two alternative signaling strategies, namely “tying-
hands” and “sunk-cost[s].”165 To tie hands, state leaders “creat[e] 
audience costs that they will suffer ex post if they do not follow through 
  
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THE POLITICS OF STATE SURVIVAL 20 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
1996); Arnim Langer, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Group Mobilization in Côte 
d’Ivoire, 33 OXFORD DEV. STUD. 25, 30 (2005). 
 160. David Lake conceptualizes hierarchy at the international level along two 
dimensions, namely security and economic hierarchy. David A. Lake, Escape from the 
State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics, 32 INT’L SECURITY 47, 49 
(2007). With regard to Franco-African relations, the establishment of a common currency 
zone denoted by the CFA Franc speaks to Lake’s concept of economic security as an 
externally-fixed exchange rate regime greatly limits a country’s monetary policy 
autonomy. CLAPHAM, supra note 159, at 93–95. 
 161. Deterrence Theory Revisited, supra note 47, at 316. 
 162. Id. at 324 (quoting BERNARD BRODIE, WAR AND POLITICS 380 (Macmillan 
1973)). 
 163. James D. Fearon, Signaling Foreign Policy Interests Tying Hands Versus 
Sinking Costs, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 68, 69 (1997). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 70. 
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on their threat or commitment (i.e., costs arising from the actions of 
domestic political audiences).”166 By the opposite token, to sink costs 
entails “taking actions such as mobilizing troops that are financially 
costly ex ante.”167 In 2002, Côte d’Ivoire and France chose the latter. 
With outstanding speed, it launched Opération Licorne and deployed 
troops on the ground within three days of the failed coup d’état; the 
initial mission was to protect and evacuate French nationals and other 
foreigners from the African country.168 In addition to the soldiers 
deployed in the aftermath of the failed coup d’état, France already had 
500 troops stationed in Côte d’Ivoire prior to launching Opération 
Licorne.169  
But French intervention consisted of more than a display of military 
might. In fact, it is fair to conclude that it was manifold. France proved 
willing to spend its political capital to get the UN directly involved in the 
Ivorian crisis. As a result of French diplomatic action, on February 4, 
2003, the UN Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1464, 
which endorsed the already-signed Linas-Marcoussis peace accord and 
requested Secretary-General Kofi Annan to formulate recommendations 
on how the UN could support its implementation.170 In other words, this 
resolution purported to legitimize ex post the two military missions (one 
by France, the other by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS)) already in place when the above-said resolution was 
  
 166. Id. at 68.  
 167. Id. 
 168. See supra note 138 and accompanying text; see also Giulia Piccolino, David 
against Goliath in Côte d’Ivoire? Laurent Gbagbo’s War against Global Governance, 
111 AFR. AFF. 1, 2 (2012). 
 169. Côte d’Ivoire, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 27, 2009),  
http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/cotedivoire/144945.htm. On the figures of French 
troops deployed on the ground in response to the September 19th events, see France 
Sending More Troops to Ivory Coast as Peace Talks Falter, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/13/world/france-sending-more-troops-to-ivory-coast-
as-peace-talks-falter.html; see also Gregory, supra note 157, at 438. 
 170. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Calls for Full 
Implementation of Côte d’Ivoire Peace Agreement, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 
1464 (2003), U.N. Press Release SC/6997 (Feb. 4, 2003). 
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tabled.171 On May 13, 2003, the Security Council unanimously adopted 
resolution 1479, which set up the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire—a 
peacekeeping mission with main objectives that included monitoring the 
ceasefire and facilitating the implementation of the above-mentioned 
agreement signed under French auspices (and pressures).172 Lastly, 
France spent further political capital to pressure African allies to 
participate in the military effort.173 As a consequence, in January 2003, 
the ECOWAS agreed to place around 1500 peacekeepers in Côte 
d’Ivoire.174 Four out of the five countries that eventually decided to join 
the French military effort were former colonies.175 The process of 
exerting pressure on other states by leveraging asymmetric relations of 
power, along with the outcome it eventually determined, further 
strengthened the image of France as primary sender, and thus, as an actor 
committed to a goal to the point of overcoming collective action 
problems and acting unilaterally if inter-state cooperation fails.176 
  
 171. On the a posteriori legitimization of the Linas-Marcoussis accords as well as 
Opération Licorne, see Bovcon, supra note 154, at 10. 
 172. The ex post legitimization rationale of UN action is further highlighted by the 
fact that the Ivorian armed forces, Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI), 
and rebel groups reached a complete ceasefire for the entire territory of Côte d’Ivoire on 
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Mission in Côte d’Ivoire, UNITED NATIONS,  
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2016); see also Cyril I. Obi, Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: 
Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte D’Ivoire, 2 
AFR. SECURITY 119, 129 (2009). 
 173. Melly & Darracq, supra note 154, at 18. 
 174. Bovcon duly underscores the inconsistency between official pledges and 
following action. On this point, she recalls,  
[initially] the authorized strength of the ECOWAS Mission in Côte 
d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) was of 2,386 men from Benin, Ghana, the Gambia, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo . . . and was 
diminished in number since many countries, for various reasons, did not 
contribute soldiers after all. As a matter of fact, by February 2003, only 
some 500 ECOWAS troops were deployed on Ivorian soil . . . .  
Bovcon, supra note 154, at 9. 
 175. Namely, Senegal, Ghana, Benin, Togo, and Niger. 
 176. Melly & Darracq, supra note 154, at 18. 
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A full understanding of commitment hinges on—and is intertwined 
with—military capability. Threatening the use of force is the core of 
deterrence theory, and the means by which states threaten others 
(including non-state armed groups for the purpose of this Article) is by 
employing the military machine. But which military capacity really 
matters in deterring potential perpetrators? In the case of French 
intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, for instance, did Gbagbo and his associates 
take into account the entire French military apparatus or only the soldiers 
and artillery locally deployed?177 To answer these questions, it might be 
useful to draw on Walt to distinguish between aggregate and offensive 
power.178 The former encompasses both actual and potential military 
capability; beyond soldiers and weapons, factors such as population, 
industrial capacity, and technological prowess are to be considered, as 
they can affect military capacity in the case of war mobilization.179 
Positing that the Ivorian leadership feared France’s aggregate strength is 
tantamount to state that they considered all of the French soldiers 
stationed at home and abroad, the entire destructive potential, along with 
other factors that could become salient in case of an all-out war. Still, 
sheer balance of power calculations should yield to more sophisticated 
explanations when there is no geographical proximity between the 
threatened and the enforcer. Hence the usefulness of employing the 
concept of offensive power, that Walt defines as “the ability to threaten 
the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state at an acceptable 
cost.”180 However, rather than state sovereignty or territorial integrity, 
what was really at stake in Côte d’Ivoire—and dear to leaders’ hearts—
was regime survival.181 In their eyes, I contend, the threat posed by 
  
 177. On the French military presence in Africa in the period preceding the First 
Ivorian Civil War, see Gregory, supra note 157, at 438; Utley, supra note 157, at 136–37. 
 178. WALT, supra note 144, at 22–25.  
 179. Id. at 22.  
 180. Id. at 24.  
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France amounted to the troops deployed on the ground, the superior air 
support, and weapon technology. It is also possible to speculate that they 
took into account troops and weapons readily (re)deployable in Côte 
d’Ivoire. In fact, France runs three primary military bases on African 
soil, namely in Senegal, Gabon, and Djibouti, in addition to the soldiers 
serving in ongoing military operations in Chad and the Central African 
Republic (CAR).182 
Lastly, France has a time-honored reputation for resolve in African 
crises—a reputation that it has eagerly upheld throughout the years 
despite increasing military and political costs.183 But how is reputation 
defined? And what inference can former African colonies draw from 
France’s long-lasting history of political interference and military 
intervention in that region? A mainstream definition is put forward by 
Gregory Miller, for whom “reputation . . . [is] a judgment about an 
actor’s past behavior that is used to predict future behavior.”184 On this 
point, I contend it is highly unlikely that Ivorian leaders could ignore 
France’s tendency to take action. According to Christopher Griffin, 
“[b]etween 1960 and early 2008, France launched 43 military operations 
in Francophone Africa.”185 The list is not exhaustive though, since France 
recently intervened in Chad, Libya, Mali, and again in the Central Africa 
  
state in order to properly identify the causes underlying the Congolese government’s 
decision to refer its domestic situation to the ICC. Burke-White, supra note 118, at 107. 
 182. Andrew Hansen, Backgrounder: The French Military in Africa, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/world/slot2_20070209.html?_r=1&. 
 183. On France’s reputation for resolve in Africa, see, e.g., Marco Wyss, The 
Gendarme Stays in Africa: France’s Military Role in Côte d’Ivoire, 3 AFR. CONFLICT & 
PEACEBUILDING REV. 81, 101 (2013). 
 184. Gregory D. Miller, Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the 
Shadow of the Past, 12 SEC. STUD. 40, 42 (2003). Miller’s definition is also adopted by 
Andrew T. Guzman. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A 
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 33 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2008). 
 185. Christopher W. Griffin, French Grand Strategy in Africa in the Fifth 
Republic (Mar. 28, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern 
California) (on file with the University of Southern California Library system), available 
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Republic.186 Such a well-established reputation for resolve must mean 
something to the leaders of French-speaking African countries. Scholars 
have long debated whether region-specific reputations can form, 
reaching different conclusions on the topic.187 While taking a position in 
this debate is beyond the scope of this article, historical and anecdotal 
evidence from Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Guinea, and Mali lend support to the claim that normative and legal 
concerns can drive French interventions in African crises where atrocity 
crimes have been—and are being—committed.188 From another 
perspective, this reputation may amount to an enduring reminder to state 
leaders in Francophone Africa that they can be ousted from power if they 
unleash widespread and systematic domestic violence.189 
When is a signal strong? If fear is in the eye of the beholder, how can 
it be assessed whether or not a threat has been duly received and decoded 
by its recipient? Drawing on mainstream IR scholarship, I disaggregate 
the concept of signal into its two attributes, namely state interest and 
commitment. I further expand the above attributes in order to consider 
two different categories of interests as well as a number of key factors 
meant to add credibility to state commitments. In all, the dyad of states 
under exam represents almost an ideal case. First, France has maintained 
tight bilateral relations with the Côte d’Ivoire even after the latter 
  
 186. On the recent French military intervention in Mali, see Dan E. Stigall, The 
French Intervention in Mali, Counterterrorism, and the Law of Armed Conflict, 223 MIL. 
L. REV. 1 (2015). 
 187. For the affirmative, see Huth, supra note 131, at 92; see also Danilovic, supra 
note 139, at 360. For the negative, see JONATHAN MERCER, REPUTATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 122 (Cornell Univ. Press 2010). For a neutral observation, see 
Deterrence Theory Revisited, supra note 47, at 316. 
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military interventions abroad and ICC official investigations (or preliminary 
examinations). Specifically, France has intervened militarily in the DRC, the CAR, Mali, 
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troops see HAGAN, supra note 9, at 109–12. 
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became independent in 1960.190 The former metropole still retains means 
and ways to exert influence on Ivorian domestic affairs. At the same 
time, the former colony is well aware of its substantial, albeit informal, 
dependence from France for political and, most importantly, military 
assistance. Second, through a consistent foreign policy over time, France 
has proven that it holds an intrinsic and strategic interest in maintaining 
its special relationship with former African colonies. Besides state 
interest, France’s reputation for resolve, signaling strategy, and offensive 
power added credibility to its commitment. In the end, the threatened 
(i.e., the Ivorian leadership) received a coherent and strong signal: either 
deescalate violence or face the risk of apprehension and prosecution 
before the ICC. The risk of misperceptions was minimal. 
C. From Practice to Theory: An Inductive Approach for 
Theorizing International Deterrence 
Thus far, I have discussed the threat of ICC prosecution without 
actually putting forward a working definition thereof. As a subset of 
international prosecution, ICC prosecution amounts to the institutional 
and normative response to the perpetration of organized and widespread 
episodes of violence. As Table 1 shows, ICC prosecution is jointly 
determined by two main casual factors: the gravity of violence and elite 
involvement in the perpetration thereof.191  
ICC Prosecution Elite Involvement – Low 
Elite Involvement – 
High 
  
 190. See Gregory, supra note 157, at 435; Wyss, supra note 183, at 85–86. 
 191. David Bosco recalls that, during Moreno-Ocampo’s tenure in office, the key 
metric for ranking the gravest situations over which the court had jurisdiction was violent 
deaths in the last several years. BOSCO, supra note 10, at 90. On elite involvement, see 
generally supra note 62 and accompanying text. For yet another example of how elite 
involvement is a necessary condition for atrocity crimes, see JOHN HAGAN & WENONA 
RYMOND-RICHMOND, DARFUR AND THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE 3, 6–7, 16–17, 27–28 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2009). 
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Gravity of 
Violence – High 
Disorganized 
Widespread Violence 
(e.g., riots) 
Organized Widespread 
Violence (e.g., civil 
conflict, genocide) 
Gravity of 
Violence – Low 
Disorganized Limited 
Violence (e.g., 
domestic crime) 
Organized Limited 
Violence (e.g., 
repressive regimes) 
Table 1 – ICC Prosecution as a function of the Nature of Violence: Ideal Typology 
Visually, ICC prosecution occurs only in the upper-right quadrant, 
where there is both high gravity of violence and elite involvement. What 
this two-by-two matrix is unable to capture, however, is how much (and 
what kind of) violence is enough to place any given episode in the upper, 
rather than the lower, row. The risk is to realize that the gravity threshold 
is met when it is already too late. To date, there is virtually no guidance 
on how to ex ante set the bar of the gravity threshold, and such a lack of 
guidance is loaded with theoretical implications for the ICC’s deterrent 
impact. Indeed, this is where normative and utilitarian considerations on 
what the ICC is meant to accomplish diverge to the point that they 
become mutually exclusive.  
To maximize the ICC’s deterrent potential, I argue that guidance by 
the OTP or other ICC offices is urgently needed. The logic is fairly 
intuitive: guidance on where to set the gravity threshold would enable the 
OTP to develop strategies aimed at preventing the escalation of mass 
violence. Conversely, the current lack of guidance makes it virtually 
impossible for the OTP to build on immediate deterrence and thus 
convey incremental signals—signals whereby the likelihood of ICC 
prosecution increases with the level of violence perpetrated until the 
gravity threshold is finally met. But to establish at what point the gravity 
threshold applies implies utilizing non-legal considerations. The ICC 
works on a limited budget and simply cannot investigate all of the 
episodes of violence that break out globally. As a consequence, only 
certain situations fall under OTP scrutiny,192 and gravity of violence 
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remains the main driver in OTP current case selection practice.193 Since a 
certain amount of violence is de facto tolerated, the underlying idea is to 
instrumentally use it to enhance the ICC’s deterrent potential. According 
to ICC officials, however, setting a quantitative threshold is not in the 
Court’s interest.194 In this view, the ICC is a judicial organ that neither is 
nor should be concerned with non-legal considerations.195 It follows that 
its only recommendation for avoiding ICC prosecution is to abstain from 
committing or being involved in the commission of atrocities in the first 
place. That said, normative considerations rule out the possibility of 
taking advantage of the ICC’s practical limits for the purpose of 
enhancing its deterrent impact in ongoing conflicts or episodes of mass 
violence. 
Pinpointing which causal factors determine ICC prosecution is also 
helpful to understand which factors do not. I already mentioned that the 
mere threat of ICC prosecution voiced by random actors has seldom, if 
ever, proved successful without the backing of major powers willing to 
bear enforcement costs.196 From the study of the Côte d’Ivoire case I 
extracted two independent variables that, combined in a specific manner, 
made the threat of ICC prosecution successful in deterring mass 
atrocities. The two variables are the likelihood of arrest or prosecution 
before the ICC and leadership survival.197 The former is mostly 
  
 193. SáCouto & Cleary, supra note 103, at 808; BOSCO, supra note 10, at 90. 
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whose survival is at stake: the state’s, or the ruler’s? He argues that “[i]n the great 
majority of cases rulers seek to assure their personal survival by seeking the survival and 
indeed strengthening of their states. They can on the whole best protect their own security 
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concerned with the credibility of threat, which is a function of whoever 
acts as enforcer. The latter focuses on the threatened, in particular on 
whether domestic decision-makers hold a positive (or negative) outlook 
regarding their chances to retain power in the short-term at the time the 
threat of ICC prosecution occurs.198 A preliminary comment on Table 2 
is timely. In the latter I dichotomize both independent variables for 
explanatory purposes, whereas they are better conceived as continuum. 
 
International (ICC) 
Deterrence 
Arrest or 
Punishment— 
High Likelihood 
Arrest or 
Punishment— 
Low Likelihood 
Leadership 
Survival— 
Positive Outlook 
Threat of ICC 
Prosecution Works 
Institutional 
Reaction: 
Gamesmanship 
Leadership 
Survival— 
Negative Outlook 
Target’s “All-In” 
Strategy: 
Peace vs. Justice 
Threat Deflection: 
Brinkmanship 
Table 2 – International Deterrence: Ideal State Strategy Typology 
The first independent variable that jointly determines successful 
deterrence is leadership survival. I further disaggregate this notion so as 
to account for two intertwined dimensions thereof: physical and political 
survival. Physical survival applies to state and rebel leaders alike. 
Individuals acting under the imminent threat of death or capture have no 
tangible incentive to comply with ICC norms.199 This assertion resonates 
  
note 159, at 4–5. In brief, Clapham’s notion of personal survival can be considered close 
to a synonym of what I label “leadership survival,” as both include the personal as well as 
the political dimension of ruler’s survival. 
 198. According to Brian L. Job, “[s]tates (more appropriately, regimes) are 
preoccupied with the short term; their security and their physical survival are dependent 
on the strategies they pursue for the moment.” Job, supra note 26, at 27. 
 199. On the fate of Africa’s ex-leaders, Arthur Goldsmith finds that, between 1960 
and 1999, sixty-four percent of African rulers have been overthrown; within the latter 
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well with teachings drawn from behavioral economics200 and leader 
survival scholarships.201 Regarding political survival, the case of Côte 
d’Ivoire suggests that state leaders see it as a function of internal and 
external legitimacy.202 At first glance, the same case study also supports 
the claim that internal and external legitimacy are each sufficient for 
state leaders to retain a positive outlook on their political survival. Yet, a 
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312–13 (2011). 
 201. On authoritarian leaders’ risk-prone military attitude and struggle to extend 
their tenure in power, see supra note 166. On state strategies to co-opt political rivals in 
the executive, see Leonardo R. Arriola, Patronage and Political Stability in Africa, 42 
COMP. POL. STUD. 1339, 1339 (2009). On the rationality of committing atrocity crimes, 
Kathryn Sikkink notices that “repression often allows officials to confront and punish 
their political opponents, prolonging in the process their own regimes and careers.” 
SIKKINK, supra note 44, at 171. 
 202. I draw on Fred Riggs’ definition of (internal) legitimacy. In his words, “[t]he 
legitimacy of a regime depends, in general, on widespread acceptance of a myth that 
promises valued benefits in exchange for recognition of authority and obedience to those 
in power.” Fred W. Riggs, Ethnonationalism, Industrialism, and the Modern State, 15 
THIRD WORLD Q. 583, 589 (1994). On external legitimacy, I borrow from Robert 
Jackson’s notion of “quasi-states” in the international society. According to Jackson, 
Southern “states actually derive much of their legitimacy from the norms of international 
society which recognise the state as the ultimate and final authority in terms of internal 
political policies.” John Glenn, The Interregnum: The South’s Insecurity Dilemma, 31 
NATIONS & NATIONALISM 45, 59 (1997). On the opportunity to distinguish between 
external and internal legitimacy, see Robert H. Jackson & Carl G. Rosberg, Why Africa’s 
Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood, 35 WORLD POL. 1, 7 
n.15 (1982). Additionally, Hyeran Jo and Beth Simmons draw a similar relationship 
between concerns on legitimacy and deterrence. See generally Hyeran Jo & Beth A. 
Simmons, Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity? (Dec. 14, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2552820.  
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more prudent conclusion suggests that the two are necessarily 
intertwined. The sheer loss of international legitimacy that followed 
Gbagbo’s refusal to step down, despite having lost the 2010 presidential 
elections, eventually undermined its domestic equivalent.203 
As said, when state or rebel leaders perceive their survival to be at 
stake, non-compliance with the law becomes the second-worst option. 
Relatedly, the cost/benefit analysis on which RDT pivots loses its 
leverage in inducing compliance. If these premises are correct, we should 
observe increased likelihood of choosing repression as state (or rebel) 
leaders perceive defeat as imminent. This raises a policy conundrum, for 
RDT fails to apply in situations when domestic power-wielders are more 
likely to unleash violence.204 Also, to date it is unknown whether the 
OTP has devised an alternative strategy to cope with those situations. To 
be clear, there is no theory claiming that the threat of criminal sanctions 
can deter all actors at all times, yet legal scholars seem to focus too much 
on actors’ character (disposition) and too little on behavior induced by 
circumstance (situation).205 Because circumstances do matter, I stress the 
importance of (re)considering the role of amnesties, as they can provide a 
substitutive pay-off structure. Such a structure would apply when the 
violence perpetrated has already met the gravity threshold and certain 
individuals have become worthy of ICC prosecution. It is at this stage 
  
 203. In explaining why the universalistic process of fair and competitive elections 
survives despite pervasive clientelism and blurred boundaries between the public and 
private spheres, Guillermo O’Donnell maintains,  
Part of the answer, at least with respect to elections to top national 
positions, is close international attention and wide reporting abroad of 
electoral irregularities. Fair elections are the main, if not the only, 
characteristic that certifies countries as democratic before other 
governments and international opinion. Nowadays this certification has 
important advantages for countries and for those who govern them.  
Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Illusions about Consolidation, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 34, 45 (1996). 
 204. That considerations about the future are necessary for deterrence to work 
properly seems to be a truism even among political scientists. For example, Jeremy 
Weinstein holds that “[m]echanisms of deterrence depend on the fact that individuals care 
about the future.” JEREMY M. WEINSTEIN, INSIDE REBELLION: THE POLITICS OF INSURGENT 
VIOLENCE 350 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006). 
 205. Here I apply Gregory Miller’s framework on reputation formation to predict 
criminal behavior. Miller, supra note 184, at 42–43. 
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that, if conflict is still ongoing, amnesties could deescalate violence by 
providing perpetrators with a positive incentive to do so. That said, both 
ICTs’ jurisprudence and mainstream legal scholarship overlook the 
importance of using amnesties selectively.206 For instance, in several 
occasions The Special Court for Sierra Leone judges upheld that 
domestic amnesties do not cover international crimes.207 By the same 
token, the ICC can “tak[e] the power to give effective amnesties away 
from [national] government[s].”208 The message ICC professionals and 
advocates are trying to convey is that compliance with international law 
is not negotiable. Such a stance adds further credibility to the threat of 
ICC prosecution, but it does so at the cost of excluding any room for 
political compromises on the issue of amnesties and other forms of 
judicial pardon. However, if the empirical distinction between the 
commission and escalation of violence is more than cheap-talk for 
international lawyers, the role of amnesties must be reconsidered. 
On leadership survival, it is worth noting that the case of Côte 
d’Ivoire concerns exclusively state actors. Regarding non-state actors, 
and rebel leaders in particular, I contend that the same framework 
applies, although the internal dynamics of rebel groups sometimes bring 
about puzzling outcomes.209 Yet, for the majority of cases pending before 
the ICC, rebel actors behaved as predicted in Table 2.210 Cross-case 
  
 206. See supra pp. 362-63, note 27 and accompanying text. Notable exceptions 
include Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 83, at 6; The Amnesty Exception, supra note 3, 
at 508–09; Eric D. Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, 
Pluralism, and Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 797, 799 (2006). 
 207. Charles C. Jalloh, Contribution of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to the 
Development of International Law, 15 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 165, 185–87 (2007). 
 208. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 507.  
 209. At the same time it is worth pointing out that certain cases deserve further 
study as they potentially challenge my theory. One prominent example is Bosco 
Ntaganda’s surrender to the US Embassy in Kigali and his formal request to be 
transferred to the ICC. Rumors were that his decision reflected his conviction that turning 
himself over to the Court was his only chance to stay alive. DR Congo: Bosco Ntaganda 
appears before ICC, BBC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-21933569. 
 210. The Lord’s Resistance Army is perhaps the clearest example of a non-state 
armed group acting in utter disregard of international laws. A similar point can be made 
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analysis suggests that, upon receiving an arrest warrant or being formally 
investigated by the Court, both state and rebel actors tend to continue in 
their misconducts.211 From another viewpoint, arrest warrants and formal 
investigations do not seem to play a significant role in preventing either 
the commission or escalation of violence. Perhaps the only noteworthy 
difference is that these legal institutes undermine rebel actors’ legitimacy 
more rapidly than state actors’ legitimacy. The Bosco Ntaganda case 
leads us to believe that ICC scrutiny can stigmatize a rebel leader, 
turning him into a liability for his own group and providing other group 
members with an incentive to remove him from command.212 That said, 
as this article is limited in scope and length, future research is needed to 
understand how the threat of ICC prosecution affects non-state actors.  
The second independent variable, namely the risk of being arrested 
and/or prosecuted before the ICC, is closely related to threat credibility. 
The issue of how to credibly signal state commitment has been dealt with 
at length in the previous subsection. As said, the more credible the 
enforcer, the more likely the threatened will end up facing justice in The 
Hague. The logic at play between the two (main) parties is reminiscent of 
card games, in particular poker. Like in poker, the threatened must adjust 
his strategy depending on who is the opponent. Analytically, it is crucial 
to remember the distinction between threatener and enforcer. For 
instance, in the following section I examine a specific case wherein the 
threat of ICC prosecution successfully prevented the escalation of 
  
with regard to several armed groups active in eastern Congo (e.g., the Congolese Rally 
for Democracy–Goma) supported by the Rwandan government, Mai-Mai groups of local 
combatants), in Sudan-Darfur (United Resistance Front), or northern Mali (Ansari Dine). 
For an episode of (reported) successful deterrence, see Song, supra note 7, at 207. 
 211. In Côte d’Ivoire, the de facto partition created by the Linas-Marcoussis 
accords did not stop hostilities between (and the commission of atrocities by) the FANCI 
and the Forces Nouvelles de Côte d’Ivoire led by Guillaume Soro. Most of the fighting 
ended by late 2004, yet the conclusion of the first Ivorian civil war was officially 
sanctioned with the signing of the Agreement of Ouagadougou on March 4, 2007. On the 
atrocities committed in the aftermath of the 2010 presidential elections by both pro-
Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara forces see Straus, supra note 61, at 486–87. 
 212. Laura Heaton, Bosco Ntaganda, ‘The Terminator,’ Surrenders to the U.S., 
DAILY BEAST (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/21/bosco-
ntaganda-the-terminator-surrenders-to-the-u-s.html. 
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violence (see Table 3, CIV(1)).213 Here, the UN adviser on the prevention 
of genocide, Mr. Juan Méndez, voiced the threat of ICC prosecution,214 
while the French army acted as enforcer. In my framework, Mr. Méndez 
played no role. The salient interaction is the one linking the Ivorian 
government (threatened) to the French army (enforcer). In another 
instance (see Table 3, CIV(3)),215 regional political actors warned 
Gbagbo to desist from his war efforts, while the subject tasked with 
enforcing the threat of ousting him from power was the ECOWAS.216 
Accordingly, Gbagbo crafted his response based on the enforcer’s 
interest, commitment, and military capability.217 
Finally, I discuss the alternative outcomes determined by moving 
along the two IVs of Table 2. The two outcomes placed in the right 
column, namely gamesmanship and brinkmanship, share a similar logic. 
In both, the absence of a credible enforcer undermines the perpetrators’ 
perception of actually facing criminal sanctions. Whether the gravity 
threshold has already been met is just one consideration domestic 
decision-makers hold in mind when gauging their chances of maintaining 
power in the short-run. When the outlook on leadership survival is 
positive, decision-makers have an incentive to formally play by (or at 
least not openly defy) the rules of the international system. By doing so, 
they further raise the cost of intervention for already recalcitrant 
enforcers. One case that aptly shows the logic of gamesmanship is Kenya 
in years following the electoral violence of late 2007/early 2008. Already 
a state party to the Rome Statute, Kenyan authorities contested, but were 
unable to prevent, the first motu proprio investigation by the OTP.218 
  
 213. See infra Table 3. 
 214. Akhavan, supra note 13, at 639–40. 
 215. See infra Table 3. 
 216. On the ECOWAS’s intervention in Côte d’Ivoire and its legality, see 
generally Julie Dubé Gagnon, ECOWAS’s Right to Intervene in Côte D’Ivoire to Install 
Alassane Ouattara as President-Elect, 3 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 51 (2013). 
 217. On Laurent Gbagbo’s brinkmanship, see McGovern, supra note 20, at 79; 
Bellamy & Williams, supra note 61, at 834. 
 218. On the political bargaining preceding Moreno-Ocampo’s decision to launch 
the Kenya investigation, see Andreas Th. Müller & Ignaz Stegmiller, Self-Referrals on 
Trial From Panacea to Patient, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1267, 1294 n.115 (2010); Ignaz 
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Then, state leaders formally pledged cooperation with the Court while 
substantially buying time and undermining its action.219 So far, it is 
possible to pinpoint three tactics considered and/or employed by Kenyan 
leaders. The first tactic was to implement domestic means of justice in 
order to reclaim the primacy of state jurisdiction over the ICC. Second, 
domestic power-wielders sought to further delay ICC investigations by 
taking advantage of article 16 of the Rome Statute.220 Supported by the 
African Union, Kenyan authorities “requested that the U.N. Security 
Council defer the cases against Uhuru Kenyatta and his number two, 
William Ruto, for one year to allow them to deal with the aftermath of an 
attack by al Qaeda-linked Somali militants.”221 Third, they actively 
undermined ICC operations on the ground. For investigations to succeed, 
full access to places, witnesses, and documents was required yet 
systematically denied or hampered.222 The quite unfortunate outcome, at 
least from an ICC standpoint, is that the OPT had withdrawn the charges 
of crimes against humanity against Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta 
due to lack of evidence.223 In all, a procedural ruling made up a political 
victory in this state struggle against the ICC.224 
  
Stegmiller, The International Criminal Court and Mali: Towards More Transparency in 
International Criminal Law Investigations?, 24 CRIM. L. F. 475, 478 n.13 (2013). 
 219. Id.  
 220. The Rome Statute maintains,  
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with 
under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in 
a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be 
renewed by the Council under the same conditions.  
Rome Statute, supra note 4. 
 221. Michelle Nichols, Africa Fails to get Kenya ICC Trials Deferred at United 
Nations, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/15/us-kenya-
icc-un-idUSBRE9AE0S420131115. 
 222. See BOSCO, supra note 10, at 158. 
 223. ICC Drops Uhuru Kenyatta Charges for Kenya Ethnic Violence, BBC NEWS 
(Dec. 5, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30347019. 
 224. For more detailed accounts on the Kenya situation at the ICC, see YVONNE 
DUTTON, RULES, POLITICS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: COMMITTING TO 
THE COURT 137–55 (Routledge 2013); Susanne D. Mueller, Kenya and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC): Politics, the Election and the Law, 8 J. E. AFR. STUD. 24, 25–26, 
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The outcomes placed on the bottom row of Table 2 share a negative 
outlook on leadership survival. As state leaders perceive an increasing 
risk of losing power, the difference between what I label “all-in” strategy 
and brinkmanship lies in whether or not they face an external threat 
serious enough to affect internal decision-making on the use of violence. 
For brinkmanship, threats of ICC prosecution, voiced by random 
political actors, are not accompanied by committed enforcers. When this 
is the case, the threatened stands firm and calls the threatener’s bluff.225 
Hence, there is no expectation to observe change in the behavior of the 
threatened. Finally, the so-called “all-in” strategy requires the presence 
of a credible enforcer and a negative outlook on leadership survival. 
Here, the threat of ICC prosecution is not only unlikely to deescalate 
violence, but it can also exacerbate it. The lower-left quadrant represents 
those cases wherein RDT has failed to deter and state leaders no longer 
have an incentive to restrain their actions for the fear of criminal 
sanctions.226 I claim that it is precisely in these cases that the offer of 
amnesty could possibly deescalate and even stop violence. Conversely, 
formulating the same offer when state leaders retain a positive outlook 
on their future may amount to a get-out-of-jail-free card, whereas in 
cases of brinkmanship the risk of arrest or prosecution is such that there 
is no need envisage forms of judicial pardon. 
D. Outside the Political Vacuum: The Need for Understanding 
African Politics 
Despite its global mission, as a matter of fact the ICC has thus far 
dedicated most attention and resources to Africa. By raising this point, 
however, I neither aim to join the rank of ICC critics nor do I support its 
alleged bias against African leaders. Rather, I contend that a greater 
understanding of the local political landscape can only enhance the 
  
29–30 (2014); Gabrielle Lynch, Electing the ‘Alliance of the Accused’: The Success of 
the Jubilee Alliance in Kenya’s Rift Valley, 8 J. E. AFR. STUD. 93, 104 (2014). 
 225. Bellamy & Williams, supra note 61, at 834. 
 226. Libya in the last few months of Qaddafi’s life and tenure in power aptly 
illustrates a situation wherein state leaders on the brink of military defeat and political 
demise have no incentive to restrain violence against enemies or civilians. 
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explanatory power of future mid-level theories on deterrence. That said, 
it might be the right time to question whether certain assumptions 
regarding international justice apply to African and non-African settings 
alike.227 While all are equal before the law, not all play by the same rules 
when it comes to politics. If so, what does it entail to be the incumbent 
leader(s) of an African country? In Claude Ake’s words, in most of 
Africa, “politics remained a zero-sum game; power was sought by all 
means and maintained by all means. Colonial rule left . . . Africa a legacy 
of intense and lawless political competition amidst an ideological void 
and a rising tide of disenchantment with the expectation of a better 
life.”228 Once in power, moreover, the new incumbent normally seizes 
state resources, excluding rival groups from access to public goods and 
services.  
Under these circumstances, electoral turnover is not meant to redress 
this unfair distribution of state resources between government and 
opposition, but rather to provide the latter with an opportunity to start 
discriminating in turn.229 As a consequence, the incumbent likely adopts 
ex ante measures aimed at influencing (and even predetermining) 
electoral outcomes. In Côte d’Ivoire, for instance, Laurent Gbagbo 
inherited from his predecessors a set of institutions and rules whereby 
“elections are so marred by repression, candidate restrictions, and/or 
fraud that there is no uncertainty about their outcome.”230 If they 
nevertheless happen to lose in the polls, sitting leaders are fully 
cognizant that they are highly unlikely to ever compete in free and fair 
  
 227. See HAGAN & RYMOND-RICHMOND, supra note 191, at 67, 69, 76. 
 228. CLAUDE AKE, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 7 (Brookings Inst. 
Press 1996); see also CLAPHAM, supra note 159, at 57. 
 229. According to Christopher Clapham, “[t]he multiparty electoral systems which 
in most African states were introduced by the departing colonial regime in the last few 
years before independence could not be expected to provide a viable framework for the 
allocation of political power once independence had been achieved.” CLAPHAM, supra 
note 159, at 53. 
 230. STEVEN LEVITSKI & LUCAN WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM: HYBRID 
REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR 7 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010). They label cases like 
Côte d’Ivoire as “hegemonic regimes.” These regimes are even less open to electoral 
turnover than “competitive authoritarian” ones, which are the bulk—and main topic—of 
the book. See CLAPHAM, supra note 159, at 56. 
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elections again. In consequence, elections become a catalyst for infra-
state violence, which explains why the OTP has begun to issue 
preventive public statements in hopes of raising the cost for local 
entrepreneurs to actually engage in post-electoral atrocities. 
Relatedly, even when opposition groups are allowed to organize into 
political parties, they have few incentives to compete in electoral 
competitions biased in favor of the incumbent, yet they usually do 
participate.231 This is because political competition between the 
incumbent and opposition unfold in ways that are quite different from 
dynamics we observe in Western democracies. Incumbents can behave as 
set forth by Leonardo Arriola, for whom “African leaders extend their 
tenure in office by expanding their patronage coalition through cabinet 
appointment[].”232 Opposition groups are therefore co-opted by the 
incumbent and offered access to state resources in return for loyalty; or 
they can abandon institutional settings and turn into a rebel group. 
Opposition and rebel groups both pursue (or are assumed to pursue) a 
political objective,233 but in a civil war scenario the latter, not the former, 
become the incumbent’s counterpart. The international community’s 
preference for inclusionary power-sharing deals further neglects the role 
of political parties, whereas it legitimizes rebel groups by inviting them 
to the negotiations table.234 On the structural factors directly affecting the 
  
 231. On this point, Clapham duly reminds that “[i]n no state on the African 
mainland, from independence through to 1990, did any opposition party gain power as 
the result of winning a general election against an incumbent government.” CLAPHAM, 
supra note 159, at 56. 
 232. Arriola, supra note 201; see also Nicolas van de Walle, Meet the New Boss, 
Same as the Old Boss? The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa, in PATRONS, 
CLIENTS AND POLICIES: PATTERNS OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND POLITICAL 
COMPETITION 50–67 (Herbert Kitchent & Steven I. Wilkinson eds., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2007). On group cooptation into the governing structure, see CLAPHAM, supra note 
159, at 59, 71.  
 233. On the role of ideology (or lack thereof) for armed groups involved in “new 
wars,” see generally KALDOR, supra note 68. 
 234. On power-sharing agreements sponsored by international actors and the 
effects these have on internal institutional dynamics, see Denis M. Tull & Andreas 
Mehler, The Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa, 
104 AFR. AFF. 375, 376, 386 (2005); Andreas Mehler, Peace and Power sharing in 
Africa: A Not So Obvious Relationship, 108 AFR. AFF. 453, 465–68 (2009); Andreas 
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onset of new civil wars, Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 
and Simon Hug find that the size of marginalized ethnic groups is a 
significant indicator of whether or not and for which purpose violence 
will be used; large groups aim to seize power from the incumbent 
(governmental conflict), while small ones pursue secession or greater 
autonomy from central authorities (territorial conflict).235 They also find 
that “after competitive elections smaller ethnic groups are more likely to 
engage in territorial conflicts, whereas after both competitive and 
noncompetitive elections, larger groups are more likely to start a conflict 
seeking to replace the central government.”236 Recalling that the rebel 
groups that launched a coup d’état in fall 2002 supported candidates who 
were not allowed to run in the 2000 presidential elections,237 it would 
thus be correct to categorize the first Ivorian civil war as a governmental 
conflict. 
Still, ICL practitioners may not yet realize how much violence occurs 
on the ground. On this point, McGowan examines the striking pattern of 
successful and failed coups d’états, along with coup plots, over a period 
of time running from 1956 to 2001.238 He finds that the region more at 
  
Mehler, Rebels and Parties: The Impact of Armed Insurgency on Representation in the 
Central African Republic, 49 J. MODERN AFR. STUD. 115, 135 (2011). Mary Kaldor duly 
points out that a key drawback of negotiating solutions between the warring parties is that 
“the talks usually involve those who are responsible for violence. Thus they raise the 
profile of the warring parties and confer a sort of public legitimacy on individuals who 
may be criminals.” KALDOR, supra note 68, at 126. On the political legitimization of 
insurgents through externally-sponsored negotiations, see CLAPHAM, supra note 159, at 
225; Stefaan Smis & Wamu Oyatambwe, Complex Political Emergencies, the 
International Community & the Congo Conflict, 29 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 411, 419 
(2002); Michael Niemann, War Making and State Making in Central Africa, 52 AFR. 
TODAY 21, 31 (2007). 
 235. Lars-Erik Cederman et al., Elections and Ethnic Civil War, 46 COMP. POL. 
STUD. 387, 394 (2013). 
 236. Id. at 389.  
 237. Namely Alassane Ouattara and Henri Konan Bédié. 
 238. Patrick J. McGowan, African Military Coups D’état, 1956–2001: Frequency, 
Trends and Distribution, 41 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 339 (2003); see also Goldsmith, supra 
note 199. Additionally, Christopher Clapham noticed that “the overthrow of nationalist 
governments by military coups d’état . . . became a fairly regular occurrence from the 
mid-1960s onwards.” CLAPHAM, supra note 159, at 50–51. Updated data on coups 
occurred globally can be found in Jonathan M. Powell & Clayton L. Thyne, Global 
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risk of political instability is, unsurprisingly, Western Africa.239 One of 
the countries that experienced all three of these violent forms of anti-
regime activity is Côte d’Ivoire, starting with a coup plot in 1991, 
followed by a successful coups d’état in 1999, and a failed one in 
2000.240 In updating McGowan’s data set, it is worth noting that rebel 
forces launched another coups d’état in 2002. Gbagbo’s five-month-long 
attempt to hold on to power after having lost the 2010 presidential 
elections can also be regarded as a coups d’état.241 This brief historical 
digression lends support to the incumbents’ obsession for security and 
regime stability. Beyond Côte d’Ivoire, recent history provides several 
other instances in which incumbents blatantly violated ICL proscriptions 
in hopes of maximizing their likelihood of survival. The list includes the 
ruling military junta in Guinea (2009),242 Muammar Gaddafi in Libya 
(2011),243 and Bashar al-Assad in Syria (2013).244 
Another noteworthy peculiarity about African politics is that leaders’ 
physical and political survivals often conflate.245 Abel Escribà-Folch and 
Joseph Wright call these power arrangements “personalist 
  
Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset, 48 J. PEACE RES. 249 (2011). On 
Africa specifically, Powell and Thyne observed 169 coup attempts between 1950 and 
2010, with a success rate of 51.5%. Id. at 255.  
 239. McGowan, supra note 240, at 355–56. 
 240. Id. at 365–66. 
 241. The idea is that, since Gbagbo had lost the 2010 presidential elections to 
Ouattara, his de facto control of the state was nevertheless illegal; as such, his tenure in 
power during the months following his electoral defeat could be regarded as an 
unconstitutional change in power. On this point, see Gagnon, supra note 216, at 65–66; 
see also Sean Butler, Separating Protection from Politics: The UN Security Council, the 
2011 Ivorian Political Crisis and the Legality of Regime Change, 20 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 251, 255 (2015). 
 242. On the atrocities allegedly committed by the Guinean military junta, see Rob 
Grace, From Design to Implementation: The Interpretation of Fact-finding Mandates, 20 
J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 27, 46, 56 nn.136, 37 (2015). 
 243. Bellamy & Williams, supra note 61, at 838–46; Siba N. Grovogui, Intricate 
Entanglement: The ICC and the Pursuit of Peace, Reconciliation and Justice in Libya, 
Guinea, and Mali, 40 AFR. DEV. 99, 106–10 (2015). 
 244. See Kirsten Ainley, The Responsibility to Protect and the International 
Criminal Court: Counteracting the Crisis, 91 INT’L AFF. 37, 38–42 (2015). 
 245. On this conflation, see CLAPHAM, supra note 159, at 4–5. 
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dictatorships.”246 According to them, “[p]ersonalist dictatorships stand 
apart from regimes based on an institutionalized organization such as a 
party or the military. Leaders in these autocracies often rely on relatively 
small support coalitions whose loyalty is ensured by the distribution of 
material rewards.”247 Similarly, Michael Bratton talks about “Big Man” 
presidentialism when referring to the same power arrangement. In his 
work, “Big Man,” presidentialism, corruption, and clientelism are the 
three dimensions of neo-patrimonial rule.248 These scholars share an 
important intuition: if the paramount leader loses power, all those who 
belong to his inner circle or have access to state resources through him 
will lose their benefits. Loyalty to the leader conflates almost perfectly 
with the subordinate’s self-interest. The well-being of these high-level 
clients is intertwined with their patron’s future in that they do have an 
interest in fighting fiercely if they perceive their patron’s tenure in power 
to be shaky. Finally, Escribà-Folch and Wright found evidence that, 
lacking an exit strategy with guarantees for former leaders during and 
after transition, “personalist dictatorships are less likely to democratize 
when more of their neighbors prosecute human rights abusers.”249 
With nine situations concerning eight African states and two more 
preliminary examinations pending,250 the ICC staff would benefit 
tremendously from improving their comprehension of African politics. 
Since most ICC officials have studied and practiced law in either Europe 
or America, they are, albeit unwillingly, responsible for furthering the 
Court’s Euro-centric bias. Unlike the law, politics does not require all 
actors to be equal and to play by the same rules; it hinges on and reflects 
local social, cultural, and historical peculiarities. Claiming that world 
regions are different from one another seems obvious, yet the ICC’s 
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global mission has apparently excluded geopolitical considerations from 
the picture. In order to dispel criticism, the OTP should do more than 
simply look into non-African states; its case selection policy should show 
greater understanding of African politics. In the end, it takes studying 
more than law books and statutes. A thorough literature review of the 
politics of violence is beyond the scope of this article, yet the purpose of 
this subsection is to add context to a decision-making process that is 
often—and mistakenly—assumed to be devoid of personal and political 
tensions. 
III. INTERNATIONAL DETERRENCE AT WORK: THE CASE OF CÔTE 
D’IVOIRE 
In this section, I identify the empirical conditions that determined 
whether Gbagbo and his associates would either obey or ignore 
international laws under the constant threat of ICC prosecution. Among 
the many instances in which international and regional actors voiced the 
threat of ICC prosecution, this section examines three episodes 
displaying significant variation in outcomes. Methodologically, it can be 
said that Côte d’Ivoire amounts to an ideal case study in that it allows for 
controlling several potential causal variables, first of all the mere threat 
of ICC prosecution. Furthermore, the selected episodes show that the 
typology of state strategies illustrated in Table 2 is dynamic in that it 
allows for movement from one quadrant to another. As shown in Table 3 
below, these episodes cover three of the four possible outcomes 
discussed in the previous section. From a different viewpoint, dynamism 
across quadrants proves that: 1) external factors intervening in one or 
both IVs may alter threat perception in he who is the target of that threat; 
and 2) Ivorian leadership did, in fact, adjust its strategy in response to 
changing signals. 
This section is organized as follows. First, I first examine episode 
CIV(1)251 in which the threat of ICC prosecution worked as expected and 
deterred the escalation of mass violence. Second, I show that leadership’s 
strategy changes with the surrounding political and military 
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circumstances. In CIV(2),252 for instance, Gbagbo’s defeat in the 2010 
elections and international condemnation of his attempt to forge electoral 
results are to be interpreted as signals negatively affecting the outlook on 
leadership survival. Finally, in CIV(3)253 I demonstrate how variation in 
the threatener’s identity alter perceptions held by the threat recipient. To 
be specific, France posed a credible threat to state leaders for all of the 
above-mentioned reasons (e.g., history of military interventions in 
Africa,254 troops deployed miles away from Gbagbo’s command,255 and 
pro-rebel positions openly upheld during the Linas-Marcoussis peace 
talks),256 while the ECOWAS mission did not (e.g., history of non-
intervention among AU members, fewer and ill-equipped troops to 
confront Ivorian armed forces in combat, and AU members’ preference 
for diplomatic solutions to the crisis).257  
International (ICC) 
Deterrence 
Arrest or 
Punishment— 
High Likelihood 
Arrest or 
Punishment— 
Low Likelihood 
Leadership 
Survival— 
Positive Outlook CIV*(1) KENYA 
Leadership 
Survival— 
Negative Outlook CIV(2) CIV(3) 
Table 3 – *Côte d'Ivoire – International Deterrence: Actual State Strategy Cartography  
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On November 6, 2004, the Ivorian air force carried out an attack on 
Bouaké, the de facto capital of Northern Côte d’Ivoire under rebel 
control, in broad daylight [CIV(1)].258 In consequence, around ten French 
soldiers died and thirty more were wounded.259 As said, those soldiers 
were stationed there as part of Opération Licorne. The parties inevitably 
disagreed as to whether the strike against French soldiers was deliberate 
or not; Ivorian authorities insisted that it was unintentional, whereas the 
French government reached the opposite conclusion.260 Disagreement 
notwithstanding, the French army quickly retaliated by destroying the 
entire Ivorian air force.261 In particular, the Dassault Mirage F1 strikers 
employed in this mission took off from the French military base in 
Gabon—a detail that stresses the importance of considering offensive 
power.262 French retaliation produced three main effects. First, it sent a 
clear signal about France’s willingness and readiness to employ military 
force. Second, the Ivorian army lost the advantage of air warfare over the 
insurgency, making it increasingly difficult to hit enemy targets across 
the buffer zone created and policed by the French peacekeepers.263 Third, 
the Ivorian leadership reacted by inciting violence against French 
expatriates and businesses through state-controlled mass media (radio 
and TV in particular).264 
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Two other important events belong in the causal chain that eventually 
led to the de-escalation of the crisis. First, in Resolution 1572 the 
Security Council demanded that the Ivorian government stop all 
broadcasting that incited hatred.265 Second, Juan Méndez, UN Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, warned state authorities that, had 
inaction by domestic courts persisted, incitement to commit violence 
would have fallen under ICC jurisdiction.266 Shortly thereafter, the 
broadcasting of appeals to violence suddenly stopped.267 Hence, the 
question is, what induced the Ivorian leadership to change behavior? 
Was it a single factor or a combination thereof? Akhavan identifies the 
ICC as the cause of such a change. In his words, earlier threats of ICC 
prosecution were less credible because the Court was barely 
established.268 In November 2004, however, the ICC was up and running 
and projected a credible threat onto Gbagbo and his associates.269 
Relatedly, Akhavan maintains that the absence of arrest warrants or 
pending trials have not dampened the Court’s deterrence impact.270 For 
him, a functioning ICC was basically sufficient to bring about successful 
deterrence.271  
Conversely, in the present account, Akhavan’s “functioning” ICC 
loses its explanatory power and is regarded as constant. 
Methodologically, the reason for this downgrade is easy to grasp. Mass 
atrocities continued to occur long after the ICC began to function, which 
is tantamount to saying that the threat of prosecution before the ICC is 
still insufficient in deterring international crimes. Both comparative and 
diachronic evidence support the foregoing conclusion. From a 
comparative viewpoint, it is possible to list a number of cases wherein 
the perceived utility of using unconstrained violence outweighed the risk 
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of incurring ICC prosecution. These cases include, as mentioned, Sudan, 
Kenya, Libya, and Guinea. From a diachronic viewpoint, by November 
2010 Gbagbo had ordered loyalist troops to employ violence against 
enemies and civilians.272 At that time, however, the ICC had already 
investigated and tried a small group of defendants.273 If not the threat of 
sanctions, some other factors must account for the above-said change of 
behavior.  
Here I contend that a favorable combination of circumstances induced 
Ivorian leaders to believe that compliance was in their best interest. First, 
retaliation against the Ivorian air force demonstrated beyond a doubt that 
France was a credible threat in theory and in practice. The latter’s use of 
military force not only eradicated any possible misperceptions about its 
commitment, but it also exemplified how coercion can be instrumentally 
employed to deter large-scale atrocities.274 Second, as of November 2004 
the Ivorian leadership held a quite positive outlook about retaining power 
in the short-run. Gbagbo’s government actively undermined any attempts 
to implement the January 2003 Linas-Marcoussis power-sharing 
agreement and bought more time by formally agreeing to the July 2004 
Accra III agreement.275 Gbagbo’s five-year mandate formally expired in 
November 2005, with the incumbent enjoying the advantage of 
controlling the electoral machine.276 He also retained the power to 
declare a state of emergency—a power that allowed him to postpone the 
2005 elections to the fall of 2008 despite international criticism.277 
Relatedly, at that time the ICC had not yet taken any formal measures 
  
 272. On post-electoral violence perpetrated by pro-Gbagbo forces, see Straus, 
supra note 61, at 483–84; Bellamy & Williams, supra note 61, at 832. 
 273. Indeed, by the fall of 2010, the ICC had already begun the trial of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Germain Katanga, and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui in the DRC case; of Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo in the CAR case; of Bahar Idriss Abu Garda and Abdallah Banda 
Abakaer Nourain in the Sudan-Darfur case. Also, arrest warrants were issued with regard 
to Uganda, the DRC, CAR, and Sudan-Darfur cases. 
 274. See Smidt, supra note 3, at 176. 
 275. See COLLIER, supra note 158, at 164. 
 276. Id. at 165–66. For another instance of Gbagbo’s exploiting the advantages of 
incumbency, see Abu Bakarr Bah, Democracy and Civil War: Citizenship and 
Peacemaking in Côte d’Ivoire, 109 AFR. AFF. 597, 614 (2010). 
 277. See Piccolino, supra note 168, at 5, 10. 
2016] Coercing Compliance with the ICC 421 
 
towards investigating alleged crimes in Côte d’Ivoire. In sum, it is fair to 
conclude that the Ivorian leadership decided to refrain from further 
incitements of violence out of self-interest. From a game-theory 
standpoint, the pay-off structure was aptly designed as to make 
compliance with ICC norms more convenient than defiance. 
The second Ivorian civil war broke out in the aftermath of the 2010 
presidential elections. After having won the first electoral round, Gbagbo 
lost the runoff to Ouattara by a fair margin (46% to 54%, with a 
difference of approximately 375,000 ballots).278 However, Gbagbo’s 
refusal to hand over the presidency to Ouattara led to a paradoxical 
situation. On one hand, he still physically controlled the state apparatus, 
including the army. On the other hand, the international community 
quickly recognized Ouattara as the legitimate president.279 Government 
de-recognition achieved more than loss of membership in 
intergovernmental organizations, as it enhanced Ouattara’s external and 
internal legitimacy at Gbagbo’s expense. This sudden, and to some 
extent, unexpected, loss of legitimacy dramatically worsened the 
leadership’s outlook on their political survival. As a result, in CIV(2)280 
we observe variation on the leadership survival variable, while the 
likelihood of arrest or punishment remains constant. Lack of variation in 
the latter depends on France maintaining its role of enforcer on the 
ground.  
CIV(2) is salient in that it exposes the limits of classic LDT. In 
particular, CIV(2) accounts for why Gbagbo changed his strategy and 
ordered the use of violence against civilians. Given the constant threat of 
ICC prosecution, his decision appears to contradict the rationality 
postulate. Even IR-based deterrence theory fails to account for this 
change. Only by bringing in expectations on leadership survival is it 
possible to shed light on the dramatic choice Gbagbo confronted in the 
aftermath of the 2010 electoral results. The fact that he eventually opted 
for what I label ‘all-in’ strategy demonstrates his will to hold on to power 
at all costs. From his choice, we can infer that the risk of facing justice 
became Gbagbo’s second-worst outcome. Violence and risk-prone 
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behaviors reinforced one another and jointly contributed to the escalation 
of violence. On one hand, worsening conditions call for risk-prone 
strategies—strategies that entail even greater violence in the future.281 On 
the other hand, the violence perpetrated represents a sunk cost which 
further discounts the adoption of riskier strategies.  
In spite of this spiraling violence, France did nothing to find a 
political solution to the crisis. It never offered Gbagbo amnesty, let alone 
a way to retain, in whole or in part, political power. By the opposite 
token, the French government aimed at a military conclusion to the 
conflict. On March 21, 2011, Sarközy’s adviser, Henri Guaino, 
announced that the French government was optimistic about pushing 
Gbagbo out of office.282 On April 3, 2011, Paris increased the Opération 
Licorne military contingent from 300 to 1,400 units.283 On April 10, 2011 
(i.e., the day before Gbagbo’s arrest), French forces, in coordination with 
UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) blue helmets, launched an 
operation targeting heavy weaponry batteries in response to attacks 
carried out by pro-Gbagbo militias.284 Unlike other regional and 
international actors, France stood firm and refused to negotiate with 
Gbagbo’s illegitimate government. In conclusion, France proved its 
reputation for resolve by upholding a coherent foreign policy and 
military strategy along the entire course of the first and second Ivorian 
civil wars. 
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Yet, France was not the only international actor attempting to bring 
the Ivorian crisis to an end. In the months following the 2010 presidential 
elections and the outbreak of the second Ivorian civil war 
(conventionally, November 28, 2010–April 11, 2011) a panoply of 
foreign actors and IGOs seized the initiative. As I illustrate below, 
however, the signals they conveyed were predominantly incoherent and, 
accordingly, Gbagbo’s illegitimate government did not perceive them as 
capable of further threatening its already shaky survival prospects 
[CIV(3)].285 Both CIV(2) and CIV(3) belong to the lower row of Table 2, 
but in the latter the threatened perceived a low(er) risk of arrest or 
punishment. Examining CIV(3) shows how variation in the enforcer 
affects the success (or failure) of deterrence. ECOWAS leaders were 
among the first to get involved in the Ivorian crisis and work for a 
diplomatic solution thereto. Frustrated by Gbagbo’s refusal to step down 
and flee the country, the ECOWAS suspended Côte d’Ivoire membership 
on December 7, 2010.286 On December 18, 2010, Nigerian President 
Goodluck Jonathan, as chairman of the ECOWAS, co-signed AU 
Commission chief Jean Ping’s letter to Gbagbo, endorsing the latter’s 
call for Gbagbo’s resignation.287 Yet, only four days later the same IGO 
offered Gbagbo asylum in Nigeria—an offer repeated by Kenyan Prime 
Minister Raila Odinga on December 28 and again by President Thomas 
Boni Yayi of Benin, President Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone, 
President Pedro Pires of Cape Verde, and Prime Minister Raila Odinga 
of Kenya on January 5, 2011.288 There is more; while offering Gbagbo 
asylum, the above countries (individually or collectively under the 
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ECOWAS banner) threatened to oust him from power on December 24 
and 28.289 In particular, on December 28, 2010, Gbagbo received both an 
offer of asylum from Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga and a threat 
of military intervention from Benin’s Boni Yayi, Sierra Leone’s Ernest 
Bai Koroma, and Cape Verde’s Pedro Pires.290 The lack of coordination 
among different actors is appalling. Further, ECOWAS members’ 
diplomatic incoherence signaled limited resolve in ordering peacekeepers 
to engage more actively in war operations.291 In the end, it suffices to say 
that, when deciding how to react to these threats, Gbagbo “stood firm 
and called their bluff.”292 But AU and ECOWAS member states were not 
alone in alternating stick and carrot with fallen president Gbagbo, the 
United States being another notable example. On this point, the Obama 
administration preferred to engage Gbagbo diplomatically. Alongside 
private talks, on December 9, 2010, President Barack Obama publicly 
warned Gbagbo of “consequences” if the latter did not step down and 
transfer power to his successor peacefully.293 State Department 
spokesman P.J. Crowley echoed Obama’s warning, adding that the US 
government had begun studying what sanctions to apply to Gbagbo and 
his closest associates in case they did not give in to international 
pressures.294 On January 3, 2011, however, a delegation of African 
leaders leaked that the US had offered him a “dignified exit.”295 After 
backchannel diplomacy failed, US strategy changed again on January 25, 
2011, when the Obama administration publicly agreed to support 
Ouattara’s call for temporary trade embargo (i.e., a month-long ban on 
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cocoa exports).296 In all, the US government proved hesitant to get 
involved in Côte d’Ivoire. There are at least two considerations that 
explain why the US adopted a soft response to the Ivorian crisis. First, 
from a geopolitical standpoint, the US had no reason to “feel 
responsible” for Côte d’Ivoire, since the latter fell in the French sphere of 
influence.297 Second, from a normative standpoint, it is plausible to assert 
that the US was unwilling to resort to military force because of its 
official stance on the ICC.  
In sum, it might be appropriate to categorize foreign actors and IGOs 
depending on whether or not they threatened the use of force against 
Gbagbo’s illegitimate government. Among those who did not threatened 
Gbagbo militarily, many advocated for and eventually undertook 
political and/or economic sanctions. The Security Council extended the 
UNOCI mandate, despite Gbagbo’s objections; the European Union 
imposed targeted sanctions, including a ban on visas and financial assets, 
against Gbagbo, his wife and nineteen other Ivorians—sanctions that 
later extended to a total of fifty-nine Gbagbo supporters; the World Bank 
suspended funding to Côte d’Ivoire, while the Central Bank of West 
African States blocked Gbagbo’s access to state funds.298 Lastly, 
Switzerland froze Gbagbo’s personal assets.299 In theory, deterrence can 
be achieved also by non-military means. Economic and political 
sanctions can alter the risk calculus and, in turn, induce change in 
behavior. That said, unarmed threats were simply ill-timed to constrain 
decision-making by the Ivorian leadership, as the latter already held a 
negative outlook on regime survival. In order to maximize the deterrent 
impact of these measures, I claim that they should rather be adopted in 
the upper-right quadrant of Table 2, when the risk of arrest or 
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punishment is low but the leadership remains nevertheless confident 
about holding on to power in the short-run. 
France aside, few other states actually threatened to resort to military 
force against Gbagbo’s government. The US, despite its ability to project 
power globally, lacked intrinsic and strategic interest to credibly commit 
as enforcer. Besides, it would have been odd for the US to uphold the 
threat of ICC prosecution after having openly opposed the Court and 
convinced over one hundred states to sign bilateral non-surrender 
agreements.300 Regarding the United Kingdom, it was Foreign Secretary 
William Hague who voiced the threat of military intervention in hopes of 
deterring further humanitarian violations.301 On this point, the UK’s 
authentic support of the ICC could amount to intrinsic interest, yet there 
was no specific reason for the British government to intervene in Côte 
d’Ivoire among several war threats active at that time. Apart from the 
lack of strategic interest, the UK did not enjoy the same reputation for 
resolve in Africa that France did, as its limited military mission in Sierra 
Leone demonstrated.302 Lastly, the ECOWAS had, on the ground, a 
significant military contingent serving alongside the Opération Licorne 
contingent. The military mission deployed in Côte d’Ivoire since fall 
2002 was later replaced by the UNOCI, but many ECOWAS member 
states extended their commitment under UN auspices.303 While it is 
debatable whether or not that military presence posed a serious threat to 
Gbagbo’s regime, I argue that the many state identities inhabiting the 
ECOWAS undermined the signaling of a coherent collective 
commitment. In the end, African states once again upheld their 
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preference for non-intervention in domestic affairs. Even after non-
African countries decided to employ military force, they pursued a sub-
optimal strategy that consisted of minimal interference, and were 
proactive in setting forth diplomatic solutions to the crisis.  
In conclusion, the case of Côte d’Ivoire is tremendously helpful in 
illustrating my argument because it allows for within-case variation. The 
first factor that makes this case study unique is the presence of a serious 
enforcer. France had intrinsic and strategic interest, strong commitment, 
and the military capability to successfully deter the Ivorian leadership 
from escalating violence. Thanks to France, Gbagbo and his associates 
correctly decoded and believed the threat of being ousted from power 
coercively and brought before the ICC. And the role of France must be 
further emphasized, as its reputation for resolve might have actually 
crossed state borders and convinced the Guinean military junta to 
cooperate with the Court on the investigation and prosecution of the 
September 28, 2009 events.304 But the case of Côte d’Ivoire also 
demonstrates that it is no longer possible to ignore the circumstances 
under which state leaders decide to unleash violence. In the aftermath of 
the 2010 presidential elections, Gbagbo and his associates saw no option 
but to resist. Moreover, the same circumstances justified, at least in their 
minds, the adoption of risk-prone strategies that called for even greater 
violence. The investigation of leaders’ evolving interests and perceptions 
over the entire Ivorian crisis has also confirmed a long-known truth 
about deterrence: For the latter to succeed, he who is under threat must 
have, or perceive to have, something worthwhile to lose. In this regard, 
the enforcer’s task is two-fold. First, it is crucial to identify what interests 
are dear to the threatened and to know how the threatened ranks them. 
On this point, the case of Côte d’Ivoire shows that assumptions can be 
misleading rather than useful. Despite many offers of asylum, for 
instance, Gbagbo decided not to flee the country and fight for power. In 
this case, empirical evidence suggests that he valued his political survival 
at least as much as, if not more than, his physical one. Second, the 
enforcer must adjust his strategy to the surrounding circumstances. There 
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is no abstract policy on which sanctions (or incentives) will be effective. 
The economic and political sanctions imposed by the above-mentioned 
IGOs failed to deter new atrocities because they did not target the 
physical or political survival of Ivorian leaders. Simply put, they missed 
the target. By the same token, offering amnesty or asylum to violent 
entrepreneurs who do not fear immediate retribution for their crimes 
might be interpreted as a sign of the enforcer’s weakness or lack of 
commitment.305 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research project examines the circumstances under which the 
threat of ICC prosecution proved successful in deterring the commission 
or escalation of mass atrocities. Findings from the case of Côte d’Ivoire 
confirm that the threat of facing justice in The Hague might, under 
specified circumstances, contribute to the de-escalation of violence. 
However, such a threat is worth little if not backed up by a major power 
willing to bear the political and economic costs of enforcing ICC 
decisions. To deter new atrocities, it is also crucial for the enforcer to 
have leverage on the threatened. If the latter has nothing to lose, ICC 
threats will either have no effect on violence or exacerbate the level 
thereof. The proposed state strategy typology illustrated in Table 2 aptly 
captures these causal variables. The likelihood of arrest or punishment is 
a function of threat credibility, which in turn hinges on the enforcer’s 
credibility. Drawing on classic IR theory, I analyze how an enforcer 
conveys a strong threat to the chosen recipient. The stronger the threat, I 
claim, the smaller the risk of the threatened misperceiving the signal. 
That said, a credible threat depends on state interest and commitment. 
Albeit analytically distinct concepts, military capability and reputation 
for resolve add credibility to state commitment during the bargaining 
phase. Empirically, only France, among the many actors who confronted 
Gbagbo’s government, was able to convey a strong signal, inducing 
domestic decision-makers to refrain from escalating violence in 
  
 305. Payam Akhavan makes a similar comment regarding Revolutionary United 
Front leader Foday Snakoh and his interpretation of the amnesty granted to him and his 
combatants in the 1999 Lomé Peace Accord. See Akhavan, supra note 13, 635–36.  
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November 2004. The empirical analysis of Côte d’Ivoire also shows that 
a credible threat is necessary but insufficient to bringing about 
compliance with ICC norms through deterrence; due attention must be 
paid to the threatened himself, especially to whether or not he holds a 
positive short-term outlook about retaining power. When that outlook is 
negative, instead, the intervening threat of ICC prosecution could cause 
what in the legal literature is referred to as “Peace vs. Justice.”306 Beyond 
the empirical analysis of a single case study, this project carries several 
implications for the study of deterrence at the international level. The 
first and foremost implication is that, when moving from the domestic to 
the international level, it is no longer possible to overlook political 
considerations. Methodologically, the threat of ICC prosecution is to be 
regarded as a necessary but trivial condition if we examine cases of mass 
atrocities occurring before and after its entry into force on July 1, 2002. 
When we carry out a comparative analysis of cases that occurred after 
that date, the threat of ICC prosecution loses its residual explanatory 
power and becomes a constant. In all, the fact that episodes of mass 
violence have continued to occur, even after the ICC was established and 
entered into force, demonstrates that we should search elsewhere for 
causal inference. This is where legal and IR scholars diverge in seeking 
explanations as to what determines whether deterrence will succeed or 
fail in coercing compliance. Legal scholars insist on intervening in the 
institutional design of laws and tribunals, while their IR colleagues go 
beyond the incentive structure and examine the relationship between 
players. This article offers a two-fold argument to review the mainstream 
rationalist approach so dear to legal scholars. The first one, as already 
mentioned, is empirical. The mere existence of a permanent criminal 
court in the Hague did not prevent several new episodes of violence from 
breaking out. The second argument is analytical. LDT pinpoints three 
main factors in the threat of criminal sanctions deterring future crimes. 
Among these three, certainty of punishment holds a greater causal power 
than the other two (severity and celerity of punishment). But the drafters 
of the Rome Statute intentionally outsourced the certainty factors to 
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states. As a result, deterrence is now mostly exogenous to the body of 
law we refer to as international criminal law. 
But acknowledging the limits of the ICC legal and institutional 
scaffolding is not tantamount to downplaying, let alone to ignoring, the 
salient novelties introduced by the Rome Statue. In this article I duly 
emphasized the scholarly claim that the ICC represents a step forward in 
deterring episodes of mass violence. ICC temporal and (potentially 
unlimited) territorial jurisdiction amounts to a necessary premise for 
potential criminals to perceive the threat of criminal sanctions upon 
them. Furthermore, its unprecedented legal flexibility allows the OTP to 
intervene in ongoing conflicts in order to deescalate mass violence. Yet, I 
contend that the ICC is nowhere close to fully exploiting its preventive 
potential. Perhaps the most important limit to improving the ICC’s 
deterrent impact is endogenous to the Court and, in particular, to those 
who work therein. By conceiving of the ICC exclusively as a judicial 
body, they knowingly neglect the international dimension thereof. 
Paraphrasing Akhavan’s words, it is time to allow political realism to 
complement—if not to dismiss—the dominant romantic view on what 
the ICC is, as well as what is meant to accomplish.307 It is also crucial for 
professionals and scholars alike to further explore the analytical 
distinction between the commission and escalation of mass violence, and 
the role the ICC can play in each. On this point, this study illustrates that 
the threat of ICC prosecution can, under specified circumstances, deter 
the escalation of violence. 
The above-said distinction is also salient in that it provides the 
opportunity to learn from IR deterrence theories. Escalation intuitively 
differs from commission in that the former entails some violent, and 
likely criminal, acts have occurred before the threat of ICC prosecution 
intervenes. In a legal debate still dominated by a rationalist 
understanding of deterrence, it follows that the timing of threat issuance 
determines whether or not incurring criminal sanctions can alter the risk 
calculus of self-interested actors. This reasoning also highlights the 
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theoretical salience of the gravity threshold envisaged by the Rome 
Statute—a potential game changer in shaping OTP incremental strategies 
devised in response to ongoing conflicts. Building on immediate 
deterrence, the OTP can match threat seriousness with the increasing 
level of violence perpetrated until the gravity threshold is finally met; 
general warnings may turn into a preliminary examination, followed by 
the opening of a formal investigation and the issuance of indictments and 
arrest warrants. The suggested logic works on perpetrators’ perceptions 
through strengthening the signal the OTP conveys to them as violence 
unfolds.  
Two recommendations follow. From a policy perspective, the OTP 
should devise a coherent plan on how to prevent the escalation of mass 
violence. In particular, targeted individuals must be able to readily and 
correctly decode OTP measures. For such a strategy to work, however, 
the OTP should also provide guidance as to when the gravity threshold is 
met. In a Court allowing limited space for realpolitik considerations, it is 
unlikely to obtain quantitative and qualitative guidelines on how to ex 
ante pinpoint precisely where the threshold is to be set. From a legal 
perspective, scholars and practitioners should refrain from importing 
domestic assumptions into the study of international deterrence. Indeed, 
the difference between domestic and international deterrence goes 
beyond the level of analysis, as each uses a distinct set of working 
assumptions. Most importantly, international deterrence requires 
researchers to identify who is the source of the threat, whereas domestic 
deterrence holds constant the role of the state as the coercive agent. 
Extended deterrence affords a new theoretical framework to search for 
the source of the threat. Put simply, potential perpetrators do not fear the 
ICC, which lacks enforcement powers, but rather the state (or collection 
thereof) that seriously commits to enforcing ICC decisions. 
In conclusion, this Article challenges the ubiquitous assumption that 
the ICC can deter future atrocities and finds evidence that, under 
specified circumstances, the threat of ICC prosecution has, in fact, 
prevented the escalation of atrocities in Côte d’Ivoire. Despite its limited 
scope, this Article has significant implications for future research. First, 
it provides the necessary empirical foundation for studying how states 
and IGOs can actually use the threat of international prosecution as a 
political resource for conflict resolution or a bargaining chip in 
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diplomatic negotiations. Second, it shows that major powers retain a 
special role in determining successful deterrence.308 The case of Côte 
d’Ivoire further illustrates that realist considerations of power are 
necessary, yet not sufficient in coercing compliance with international 
laws. Because of the unique relationship between France and Côte 
d’Ivoire, however, it is difficult to analytically disaggregate the threat 
and pinpoint which factor(s) held the greatest causal effect. Since 
findings drawn from a single case do not allow for generalization, it is 
only possible to speculate that an asymmetric—or hierarchical in Lake’s 
terms—relationship between enforcer and threatened is both necessary 
and sufficient to convey a credible threat to the latter. This speculation 
can be reformulated into a hypothesis and tested in future studies. Lastly, 
this Article stresses the importance of state leaders’ perceptions. 
Considerations on leadership survival in the short-run may be the key to 
predicting whether the threat of ICC prosecution will either deter or 
exacerbate the escalation of mass atrocities. 
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